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NOTE
FATAL DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF BATTERED
WOMAN'S SYNDROME EXPERT TESTIMONY FOR
GAY MEN AND LESBIANS WHO KILL ABUSIVE
PARTNERS
INTRODUCTION
In 1977, while living in her native Puerto Rico, Annette
Green met Yvonne Julio.' Green was eighteen-years-old and
spoke no English. After developing a sexual relationship, the
couple moved to Florida where they set up housekeeping in a
trailer. Green cared for Julio's two young twin daughters, got a
job in a nursery and began to attend school to learn English.
One night, soon after they had moved to Florida, Green
cooked a meal that "did not come out right."2 Julio responded
by punching her until she could no longer breathe. After this
initial incident, the relationship deteriorated. Julio forced Green
to sleep on a mattress on the floor at the foot of the bed and
beat her often, sometimes in the presence of other people.
Friends of the couple witnessed Julio strike Green with her fists,
her feet and once with a two-by-four wooden board.
The violence escalated further after Julio purchased a hand-
gun. People at the trailer park saw Green fleeing her home on a
number of occasions, with Julio in pursuit and the gun drawn.
Sometimes Julio held the gun to Green's and the children's
heads, one time threatening to "blow [her own daughter's]
brains out."3 When Green intervened, she was beaten.
Both Green and the children sustained numerous injuries
Brief for Appellant at 14, State v. Green, No. 90-0039 (Fin. DisL Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 15.
Id. (quoting Record on Appeal at 1211, Green (No. 90-0039)).
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over the eleven years of the relationship. Green's coworkers at
the nursery often saw her with black eyes and facial bruises. She
suffered, on different occasions, a busted lip, hematomas, con-
cussions, broken ribs, a broken nose and a dislocated jaw. Se -
eral times she was beaten unconscious. Once a next-door neigh-
bor noticed that a "hunk of meat was out of [Green's] arm."4 On
the same day, one of the daughters had bite marks and bruises
all over her arms and back.
Green's attempts to leave were constantly thwarted by Ju-
lio. On one occasion, after a severe beating, Green tried to es-
cape but was captured by Julio and tied to the bed. Even when
she was able to break away she soon returned. Initially she re-
turned because she believed or wanted to believe Julio's
promises of reform. As Julio's threats of violence increased, how-
ever, she returned because she feared that Julio would kill her if
she did not return, or harm the children or others.
On October 29, 1988 Green accompanied Julio and the chil-
dren to a Halloween party. While at the party, Green drank ap-
proximately five or six beers and three mixed drinks; Julio drank
and also snorted cocaine. Later in the evening Green decided to
take the children home. When Julio did not return after a few
hours, Green began to worry; when Julio drank and used drugs,
a beating usually followed. Green phoned the party several times
attempting to convince Julio to come home. When this failed,
she drove back to the party at 3:45 a.m. Julio was extremely
angry.
The couple and another friend drove back to the trailer.
Upon arriving at the home, Julio immediately went into the bed-
room where the safe was kept. Green knew that the safe usually
contained more cocaine and Julio's guns. Green followed Julio
into the bedroom and the two began to argue. Green picked up a
knife and told Julio to get away from the safe. Julio reached for
the knife and Green stabbed her in the thigh. Julio then looked
at Green "like fire was going to come out of her eyes" and said,
pointing to the dresser, "That's it. You might as well kill me.
There's the gun."' 5 Green assumed that Julio now intended to
kill her.
Green picked up the gun and Julio lunged at her. Green
" Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 17 (quoting Record on Appeal at 1248-49, Green (No. 90-0039)).
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told her not to come any closer and cocked the gun. Julio said,
"That is it. I am going to get the gun."6 Green pulled the trigger
and Julio fell to the ground. Green yelled for her friend, who was
still in the living room, to call the police. When the police ar-
rived, they found Julio dead with a gunshot wound to the face
and a stab wound in her thigh. Green confessed to the murder.
At Green's trial for first degree murder, the defense offered
testimony from an expert on intimate violence to support
Green's plea of self-defense. 8 The expert was permitted to testify
about battered woman's syndrome," and to give an opinion on
whether Green suffered from the syndrome and was in fear of
bodily harm on the night of the murder.10
Despite the defense's efforts, a jury convicted Green of sec-
ond degree murder on September 7, 1989.
Jurors questioned after [her] trial said that male jurors refused to be-
lieve Green suffered from battered woman syndrome, although all be-
lieved that she had been beaten. According to [one member of the
defense team], the prosecution played heavily on the fact, admitted
by Green in direct examination, that she had once before threatened
her lover with a gun. Thus, Green was taken out of the realm of the
victim and placed into that of the perpetrator-no longer worthy of
the jury's mercy."'
The judge sentenced Green to twelve years in prison and five
Id. (quoting Record on Appeal at 1254, Green (No. 90-0039)).
Affidavit in Support of Probable Cause at 5, PBSO No. 88-198084 (filed Oct. 30,
1988).
8 Appellant's Brief at 12, Green (No. 90-0039); Trial Transcript at 912, Green (No.
90-0039).
1 Trial Transcript at 938, Green (No. 90-0039). "Battered woman's syndrome" is the
term used to describe the pattern of violence in abusive households and the effect of
such violence on its victims. Many current theorists have difficulty with the term because
it has been applied in such a way to connote an illness for which there are definitive
symptoms. See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text. When the term "battered wo-
man's syndrome" in used in this Note, it refers to the form of expert testimony that
relies on Dr. Lenore Walker's theories on the effects of intimate violence on women. The
majority of courtroom experts rely on Dr. Walker's theories to explain why battered
women kill their abusive partners. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. This Note
proposes that expert testimony on the effects of intimate violence for gay and lesbian
victims of abuse should be differentiated from expert testimony on battered woman's
syndrome and therefore should be distinguished.
10 Trial Transcript at 948, Green (No. 90-0039).
', Arlaine Rockey, To Male Jurors, Battered Lesbian Fought Bach Once Too Often,
MIAMI REVIEW, Oct. 24, 1989, at 8.
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years probation. 12 In 1991 an appellate court reversed her con-
viction due to technical errors during the jury voir dire.13 On
remand Green accepted a plea bargain in the Spring of 1991 and
was sentenced to time served.' 4
Annette Green's case is compelling on a number of different
levels. First, it is a part of the growing body of evidence that
intimate violence15 is as prevalent in the gay and lesbian com-
munity as it is in the heterosexual community.' 6 Second, it is the
first case in which an expert on battered woman's syndrome was
" Appellant's Brief at 2, Green (No. 90-0039).
13 Green v. State, 575 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
14 Telephone Conversation with William Lasley, Annette Green's defense attorney
(Oct. 9, 1991).
"5 Terms like family violence and domestic violence, widely used by scholars, courts
and the media, belittle the problem by linking the violent assault to the safe, reassuring
image of the home.
"Domestic violence" has a tame sound-like a household pet, no longer wild. A
"domestic problem" sounds minor and uninteresting; perhaps trouble with bill-
paying or disagreements over the division of household chores. Somehow, we
devalue incidents that occur in the home. News accounts still report serious
assaults and even murders between partners as "the result of a domestic argu-
ment," masking the extremity of the acts and the history of threat and brutali-
zation that frequently preceded such events.
ANGELA BROWNE. WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 5 (1987). Additionally, the term "domes-
tic violence" is too strongly linked to violence against women by their male partners. As
such, it does not accurately reflect violence that occurs between same-sex couples.
Some scholars have urged adopting the term "intimate violence" to describe violence
that occurs among all family members because it more accurately shows that violence
infects a broad range of relationships within which violence occurs. See JULIE BLACKMAN,
INTIMATE VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INJUSTICE (1989). But see BROWNE, supra, at 3. Browne
argues that violence between romantic partners differs from violence between non-ro-
mantic family members. To be understood, violence between romantic partners must be
studied within its specific context, with attention given to the "cultural expectations of
romance and relating" that may encourage abuse. Id.
This Note will use the term "intimate violence" to describe abuse that occurs be-
tween adult romantic partners, including both heterosexual and same-sex couples.
"6 Most sources estimate that approximately 21 percent of all heterosexual couples
experience intimate violence each year. See BROWNE, supra note 15, at 5 (estimating that
at least 1.5 million women are assaulted each year by their male partners); REPORT OF
THE COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN. REPORT 1-91, 8 (1991) [hereinafter AMA REPORT] (finding that approximately
two million women are severely assaulted each year). Most researchers agree, however,
that figures based on national surveys underestimate greatly the frequency of violence in
the population because they do not include some groups such as the very poor or non
English speaking, nor do they report violence that victims do not acknowledge. As a
result, the actual rate of heterosexual partner violence may be more than double current
estimates. Id.
[Vol. 58: 1379
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permitted to testify in a battered lesbian self-defense case. 1
Third, it stands as stark evidence that testimony on battered
woman's syndrome fails many defendants who do not fit the
stereotype of the "good battered woman."'"
Although heterosexual women are most likely to experience
intimate violence from male partners,' there is evidence that
gay men and lesbians 0 are as likely, proportionally, to encounter
violence in their intimate relationships.2 Furthermore, typical
,7 Andrew Blum et al, Scratch That Defense, NAT'L L J., Sept. 25, 1989, at 6.
18 See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (discussing the "good battered wo-
man" stereotype).
,9 For example, in 1986 New York State police reported a total of 52,563 incidents
of intimate violence, including violations of existing protective orders. Of these, 74%
(39,039) involved women assaulted by husbands and common-law husbands; 9% (5042)
involved men assaulted by wives or common-law wives; 8% (4592) involved parents as-
saulted by a child; and 7% (3893) involved children assaulted by a parent. GovERNoR's
TASK FORCE ON DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
NEW YORK STATE DoMEsTIc VIOLENCE (1986). See also BROWNE, supra note 15, at 8 (cit-
ing a number of studies that report between 94 and 95 percent of all partner assaults are
women victimized by men). According to the American Medical Association, a woman is
more likely to be assaulted and injured or raped by a current or ex-male partner than by
any other assailant. AMA REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
Furthermore, when intrafamily assaults are lethal, women are the most frequent vic-
tims. In 1987, from a total of 3317 intra-family murders, 31.5 percent (1045) of the vic-
tims were female partners and 16A percent (543) were male partners. BUREAu OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DoMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS 12 (1989) [here-
inafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS]. See also FEDERAL BUREU OF INVESGATION.
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1983
(1984) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1983] (finding that 17 percent of all homi-
cides are intrafamily). In fact, some studies show that a woman has a greater chance of
being killed by a current or former intimate partner than by any other person. Domsrc
VIOLENCE STATISTICS, supra, at 9 (noting that 51 percent of all women killed are killed by
current or former intimate partners); see also AMA REPORT, supra note 16, at 9 (finding
that between 1976 and 1987, of the approximately 38,648 people killed by an intimate
partner, 61 percent were women killed by either a married, common-law, ex-married or
dating male partner). But see FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1989, 12 (1990) [hereinafter
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1989] (estimating that only 28 percent of all female homicide
victims were killed by husbands or boyfriends).
20 This Note assumes that intimate violence and its effects are not gender-specific.
Thus, unless otherwise indicated, gay men and lesbians are considered one group. This
merging is due, in part, to the minimal work that has been done on either gay or lesbian
intimate violence. Further research may reveal some differences between both heterosex-
ual women and gay men and lesbians, and between gay men and lesbians. Additionally,
most of the theoretical treatises used in this Note focus on lesbian legal theory and inti-
mate violence because less work has been done on gay male intimate violence. Thus, this
Note is just a first step for further study into the potential differences between gay and
lesbian survivors of intimate violence.
2 See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (estimating the rates of intimate
1993] 1383
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gay and lesbian violence and its patterns and effects appear to
be virtually identical to heterosexual intimate violence.22 The
only difference, which is not minor, is the couple's shared gen-
der. Despite this difference, however, the severity of the violence
against gay and lesbian partners often yields the same result:
victimized partners resort to lethal force. In some of these cases,
like those of some heterosexual battered women, the lethal con-
duct occurs in circumstances that support a viable self-defense
claim.23
According to many feminist legal scholars, however, self-de-
fense has been historically unsuccessful when used by battered
women. Theorists who studied women's self-defense cases in the
mid-1970s found that judges and jurors were often unable to
separate their preconceived notions of intimate violence and of
femininity from the individual woman on trial for killing her
abusive spouse.24 Consequently, feminists urged the admittance
of expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome, in large part
derived from Dr. Lenore Walker's theories, to convey the wo-
man's experiences to the judge and jurors and to rebut the ste-
reotypes that influenced how the woman's actions were viewed.
Recently such testimony has been criticized by feminist com-
mentators for focusing on learned helplessness to explain the
woman's failure to flee the relationship25 and for its part in cre-
ating a stereotype of the "good battered woman. ''26 Yet, battered
violence between same-sex partners).
22 See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text (comparing heterosexual intimate
violence and same-sex intimate violence).
23 Under common law, the defendant is justified in using deadly force against the
aggressor if at the time of its use: "(1) [the defendant] is not the aggressor; and (2) (she
or] he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to combat imminent, unlawful
deadly force by [the victim]." JOSHUA DRESSLER. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, at 191
(reprint 1990) (1987). Within this rubric, the use of deadly force is not justified if the
force used against the victim is not proportional to the threat; the defendant's percep-
tion of the threat is unreasonable; and, in some circumstances, the defendant fails to
retreat if she or he can do so safely. Id. at 191-98; see also infra notes 110-28 and accom-
panying text (reviewing the difficulties women have had in meeting the requirements of
self-defense).
2 See infra notes 93-128 and accompanying text (examining female stereotypes and
the bias inherent in traditional self-defense theory).
11 See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42-54 (1979); see also infra notes
174-80 and accompanying text (discussing Walker's adaptation of the social learning the-
ory of learned helplessness for battered women); infra notes 186-97 and accompanying
text (criticizing this theory).
"' In short, the "good battered woman" stereotype is the term used to describe the
[Vol. 58:1379
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woman's syndrome remains the theory most commonly used to
explain the cycle and effect of intimate violence on heterosexual
women.
2 7
Similarly, many judges and jurors subscribe to stereotypes
of gay men and lesbians that influence their perception of the
battered defendant and his or her actions.28 Prejudice against
gay men and lesbians is particularly deep-rooted and, in some
cases, publicly sanctioned by the state.29 Just as preconceived
notions about women have muddied a fact-Ander's ability to as-
sess heterosexual intimate violence, so do preconceived notions
about gay men and lesbians affect a fact-finder's ability to judge
gay and lesbian self-defense cases. For these reasons, gay men
and lesbians on trial for killing their abusive partners are in the
same position as heterosexual women defendants. Thus, their
defense requires a similar type of expert testimony that can re-
but the dangerous presumptions held by the judge and jury.
Despite the similarities between heterosexual battered
women and battered gay men and lesbians, reliance on tradi-
tional battered woman's syndrome expert testimony by gay men
and lesbians will likely exacerbate their problems at trial, rather
than alleviate them. First, the Walker model of battered wo-
man's syndrome has been largely unsuccessful in non-traditional
cases and may expose the defendant to stereotypes and mis-
perceptions to which battered heterosexual women have been
exposed.30 Second, because the testimony on battered woman's
syndrome was developed for use with battered women, the the-
ory itself is gender-specific. Its language and many of its basic
model battered woman who displays each of the "symptoms" described in the typical
Walker model Since many experts offer the Walker model by rote, and because many
judges view the testimony as a form of diagnosis, women that do not fit the model have
been found by courts not to have "battered woman's syndrome." The Green case is a
perfect example. See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (reviewing the problems
created by the "good battered woman" stereotype for battered heterosexual women and
for battered gay men and lesbians).
1 See infra notes 158-97 and accompanying text (examining the use of expert testi-
mony on battered woman's syndrome in women's self-defense cases).
1" See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing stereotypes of gay men
and lesbians).
29 See infra notes 13641 and accompanying text (reviewing sodomy laws and
prohibitions against same-sex marriages).
11 See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text (criticizing battered woman's syn-
drome expert testimony).
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tenets do not translate to same-sex couples.31
Although battered woman's syndrome is the term attorneys,
judges and the publilc identify most readily with the causes and
effects of intimate violence, expert testimony on intimate vio-
lence does not have to be offered under its auspices. In fact, two
of the more recent studies on battered women and family vio-
lence mention the term "battered woman's syndrome" only
when referring either to the kind of expert testimony routinely
offered in court,32 or specifically to Walker. 3 Both empirically-
based studies offer compelling explanations for intimate violence
and its effects without focusing on helplessness or on gender-role
theories. The thoughtful use of these studies instead of battered
woman's syndrome may result in less gender-role analysis 34 and
sexual stereotyping by the jury.3 5
This Note analyzes expert testimony on battered woman's
syndrome in terms of its gender-specificity and argues that, de-
spite the similarities between heterosexual intimate violence and
same-sex intimate violence, the terminology and basic assump-
tions associated with the testimony make it inapplicable to gay
and lesbian defendants. Part I explores the similarities and dif-
ferences between same-sex intimate violence and heterosexual
intimate violence, revealing the relative unavailability of emer-
gency and legal services to gay men and lesbians as compared to
those available to battered women. Part II explains how stereo-
types and biases against women have historically affected their
3' See infra notes 201-17 and accompanying text (reviewing the difficulties of ex-
plaining battered woman's syndrome in gender-neutral terms).
32 See, e.g., BROWNE, supra note 15, at 177 ("Expert witness testimony on the 'bat-
tered woman syndrome' . . . although intended to address damaging myths and mis-
perceptions, also contributes in a subtle way to an image of maladjustment or
pathology.").
3 See, e.g., BLACKMAN, supra note 15, at 48-53, 190-93.
3' "Gender-role analysis" refers to the thought process by which individuals are
judged to be normal or abnormal based upon their perceived ability to fit within stere-
otypical gender-role models.
"' No current theory about intimate violence can be completely disassociated from
heterosexual women, however. Virtually all intimate violence studies arise from the work
of feminist legal theorists and researchers who study battered women and women who
kill their abusive partners. Although this Note advocates a different approach for bat-
tered gay men and lesbians, it also presumes that some of the premises upon which femi-
nist legal theorists base their work are still valid and educational. The experiences of
battered women in court that evolved from the practical application of the theories in-
form the way in which these theories can be rethought and reapplied.
1386 [Vol. 58:1379
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use of the traditional defense of justification. This Part argues
that stereotypes of and prejudices against gay men and lesbians
similarly undermine the fair adjudication of their cases. Part III
discusses the creation of expert testimony on battered woman's
syndrome, the subsequent criticisms of the way the testimony
has been given and heard, and how these criticisms are likely to
affect the ability of gay and lesbian defendants to use the testi-
mony successfully. Since this Note concludes that gay and les-
bian self-defense cases likely will suffer from the use of expert
testimony on battered woman's syndrome, it proposes the use of
two alternative theories of intimate violence that may result in
less gender-role analysis by the judge and jury.
I. COMPARING THE EXPERIENCES OF INTIMATE VIOLENCE BY GAY
MEN AND LESBIANS TO HETEROSEXUALS
Intimate violence between gay men or between lesbians is at
once similar to and different from heterosexual intimate vio-
lence. 6 The violence itself, its patterns and its results, appears
to be virtually identical. However, the difference-the couple's
shared gender-so fundamentally alters people's perception of
36 See CAROL GILLIGAN. IN A DIFFERENr VoicE 14 (1982) (arguing that "it is difficult
to say 'different' without saying 'better' or 'worse'... ."; because male behavior long has
been regarded as the norm, any behavior that differs from male patterns is usually inter-
preted as deviant or inferior). See also Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9
WoUEN's RTs. L REP. 195 (1986). Schneider views the current problems with expert tes-
timony in battered women's cases as a "natural result of the 'differences' approach." Id.
at 214. The use of specialized expert testimony sets women's self-defense cases apart
from other self-defense cases. Courts are thus encouraged to view the battered woman's
case as not only different from other cases, but also as inferior. Id. For example, many
courts interpret battered woman's syndrome as evidence of diminished capacity or
mental illness. See infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty
courts have in understanding expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome).
Schneider's arguments are of particular importance to gay and lesbian defendants.
Gay men and lesbians, like heterosexual women, receive unequal treatment in courts
because they, too, have difficulty fitting into the male heterosexist-based model of the
law. Advocating different treatment for gay men and lesbians sets them apart as differ-
ent and invites continued stereotyping of them as inferior. This is especially true in the
area of intimate violence where gay men and lesbians are arguing that they are the
"same" as battered women when, as a group and as separate individuals, they are not.
Close and frequent comparisons between battered women and battered gay men and
lesbians will detract from the legal arguments in the case because they invite a fact-
finder to focus on the differences between the groups. Furthermore, assuming Schneider
is right-that different means inferior-gay men's and lesbians' experiences will un-
doubtedly be found inferior to that of battered women's.
1993]
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the relationship that the similarities are dwarfed. For this rea-
son, battered gay men and lesbians do not receive the treatment
provided to battered heterosexual women. There is virtually no
area, from victim emergency services to police and judicial re-
sponses to the batterer, where homophobic attitudes do not
color the way same-sex intimate violence is treated. The irra-
tionality of the attitude that the gender of the partners should
dictate the response to the violence is particularly ironic when
accounts by same-sex intimate violence survivors usually make
no reference to the gender of the parties.
A. Typical Patterns of Intimate Violence
There are no reliable statistics on the prevalence of intimate
violence in the gay and lesbian community. Anecdotal evidence
from shelter workers, psychologists and anti-violence project
personnel, however, indicates that such violence probably occurs
at the same rate as it occurs in heterosexual households or in
approximately twenty percent of all gay and lesbian relation-
ships.3 7 There is some evidence that violence may occur with
more frequency between gay men than between lesbians,3 but
37 See Elizabeth Rhodes, Closeted Violence: Authorities, Experts Slowly Start to
Offer More Help to Battered-and Battering-Partners of the Same Sex, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 23, 1991, at F1 ("Statistics are scant because domestic violence 'is a denied
issue within the gay and lesbian communities. People don't want to admit that it hap-
pens.... [O]ur best guesstimate, based on the work we've done, is that domestic violence
is no less or more prevalent than in the heterosexual community.' ") (quoting Ned Far-
ley, Clinical Director, Seattle Counseling Services for Sexual Minorities). Based on the
estimate that approximately 20 percent of all heterosexual couples experience violence,
Farley estimates that in his county approximately 30,000 gay men and lesbians were
affected in 1990. Id. See also Jane Garcia, The Cost of Escaping Domestic Violence, L.A.
TIMES, May 6, 1991, at E2 ("[D]omestic abuse experts say [intimate violence] is as likely
to occur among lesbians as among heterosexual couples."); Joyce Price, Domestic Vio-
lence Between Gays a Hidden Crisis, Counselors Say, WASH. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A3
(Dr. David Island, a psychologist and co-author of THE INNER CLOSE1. GAY MEN'S Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE (1991), estimates that intimate violence occurs among 600,000 gay men
and lesbians nationwide).
" See Price, supra note 37, at A3 (Dr. Island estimates that 500,000 gay men are
battered by live-in companions, whereas only 50,000 to 100,000 lesbians experience inti-
mate violence); NEw YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT. INC., 1990
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1990) [hereinafter AVP REPORT] (of the 143 gay and lesbian domestic
violence cases opened in 1990, 45 percent (64 cases) were women, and 55 percent (79
cases) were men). However, the AVP Report notes that "this gender breakdown is par-
ticularly noteworthy when compared with the gender make-up of the Project's overall
caseload, of whom only 20% were female." Id.
[Vol. 58:1379
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here, as elsewhere, too little empirical research has been done.39
Regardless of the numbers, it is clear from personal accounts
that intimate violence exists40 and that it can be lethal. 41
Gay and lesbian survivors of intimate violence indicate that
the typical abuse they encountered was virtually identical to and
followed the same patterns as the violence in abusive heterosex-
ual relationships. Victims report physical assaults and assaults
with weapons, 4s rape and sex on demand,4 3 property damage, 4
" The only "empirical" studies of which this author is aware are: Valerie E. Cole-
man, Violence in Lesbian Relationships: A Between Groups Comparison (1990) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Santa Monica)) (estimating that ap-
proximately 46 percent of all lesbians experience repeated abusive incidents-however,
this is based on a study of only 90 couples); DAmD ISLAND & PATRICK LnrruM THE
INNER CLOSET~ GAY MEN's Do.xsTic VIOLENCE (1991). Since neither the police, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, nor the United States Justice Department collect statistics
on same-sex intimate violence, the likelihood of a reliable estimate is slim. But see Fam-
ily and Other Intimate Assaults-Atlanta, 1984, 39 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. August 10, 1990, at 527 (citing an Atlanta study where statistics on gay and lesbian
intimate violence were collected but merged with figures on heterosexual violence).
40 See, e.g., NAmiG THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING Our ABoUT LE SqBIAN BATIERING (Kerry
Lobel ed., 1986) [hereinafter NAMING THE VIOLENCE] (containing 15 personal accounts of
lesbian survivors of intimate violence and 11 articles by researchers, shelter workers and
counselors); Amy Edgington, Anyone But Me, GAY CoMMauNITv NEws, July 16, 1989 (pro-
viding a personal account of a lesbian survivor of intimate violence); Two SurniLors
Speak Out on Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence, STOP TIlE VIoLENcE, Summer 1990,
at 6; see also Garcia, supra note 37, at E2 (containing personal accounts of gay and
lesbian survivors and interviews with counselors, psychologists and shelter workers);
Price, supra note 37, at A3 (same); Rhodes, supra note 37, at F1 (same); Phyllis Win-
field, Rare Program Aids Battered Lesbians, Gays: Violence Mirrors Heterosexual Inci-
dents, SEATTLE Tinrs, Sept. 24, 1990, at E3 (same).
41 There are no government statistics on the lethality of same-sex intimate violence.
Since the severity of violence reported by gay men and lesbians is comparable to the
severity of the violence reported by heterosexual women whose relationships ended in
lethal confrontations, there is reason to assume that the rate of lethality is similar. As
additional evidence, there are reported homicide cases where evidence of prior intimate
violence by the victim was presented by the gay or lesbian defendant. See, e.g., People v.
Spencer, 458 P.2d 43 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1969) (defendant, who killed her les-
bian lover, asserted a heat of passion defense and presented evidence of prior violence by
the victim against the defendant); State v. Green, 575 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (defendant, who killed her lesbian lover, presented evidence of prior acts of inti-
mate violence); Bristow v. State, 338 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant,
who killed his gay lover, asserted self-defense and presented evidence of being battered
by the victim); People v. Huber, 475 N.E.2d 599 (IlL App. Ct. 1985) (defendant, who
killed her lesbian lover, presented evidence of prior violence); Crawford v. State, 404
A.2d 244 (Md. 1979) (defendant, who killed her lesbian lover, presented evidence of prior
violence against her by the victim).
42 Barbara Hart, Lesbian Battering: An Examination, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE,
supra note 40, at 188. Lesbians report being bitten, scratched, kicked, punched,
stomped, slapped, thrown down stairs, locked in closets and deprived of heat or food.
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harassment, death threats against the victim and third parties, 45
economic control,46 and psychological abuse, including isolation
from friends and family.47 Like heterosexual women, gay or les-
They also report being assaulted with "guns, knives, whips, tire irons, cars, tent poles,
high-heeled shoes, chair legs, broken bottles, pillows, cigarettes and poison." Id. Com-
pare BROWNE, supra note 15, at 14 (battered women reported being pushed, shoved,
slapped, hit, punched, kicked, hit with objects, thrown bodily, choked, smothered,
burned, held under water, and assaulted with a knife or gun).
" Compare Hart, supra note 42, at 188 (sexual assaults included "rape; sex on de-
mand ... weapons utilized or threatened; forced sex with others; involuntary prostitu-
tion . . . [and] sexually degrading language") with BROWNE, supra note 15, at 95-103.
Browne reports that approximately 59 percent of the battered women in her study re-
ported incidents of rape; among battered women who killed their partners, the rate was
as high as 76 percent. Id. at 95-96. According to Browne:
[S]exual abuse ... is an 'optimal' kind of violence. It is possible to inflict an
intense level of pain over a prolonged period of time without killing the victim;
and to cause a wide range of injuries, from superficial bruises and tearing to
serious internal injuries and scarring. The psychological impact of sexual as-
sault can also be extreme, especially when the attack is violent and threaten-
ing, and the psychological aftereffects may last for years.
Id. at 101. Additionally, partners who are raped are the least likely victims to report the
assault. AMA REPORT, supra note 16, at 7.
"' Hart, supra note 42, at 188 (Property damage included "arson; slashing of car
tires, clothing, and furniture; pet abuse or destruction; stealing and destruction of prop-
erty; breaking and entering; pulling out telephones; [and] breaking household items.").
" Id.; see BROWNE, supra note 15, at 65 (finding that 83 percent of the men in the
homicide group, compared with 59 percent of the men in the comparison group,
threatened to harm or kill their partner, other people and/or themselves). Browne's
study of battered women who killed uses, as a control or comparison group, violent rela-
tionships that did not end in a lethal confrontation.
4' Although many battered spouses maintain independent jobs and incomes, their
abusive partners often maintain control over the money. Compare Victoria M. Mather,
The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert
Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545, 555-56 (1988) ("Women frequently cite economic
deprivation in battering relationships. The husband will not give his wife any money
without her 'justifying' it, or he will direct her to pay the bills and run the household
without giving her adequate funds to do so.") with Breeze, For Better or Worse, in NAM-
ING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 49 ("While I was more independent than Anna
economically, I relied on her to make important decisions regarding the household and
our lives in general .... Anna demanded freedom to come and go as she pleased while
requiring me to ask permission to do anything other than my work.").
'" Hart, supra note 42, at 189; see Jeanne Cormier, Coming Full Circle, in NAMING
THE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 125 ("Slowly, she tried to control my communications
with family and friends, and wanted me to sever connections with my past."). Lesbians
and gay men may experience a different form of isolation than heterosexual women do
due to homophobia in society at large, and the gay and lesbian community's own atti-
tudes about intimate violence:
[L]esbians are less likely than heterosexual women to turn to family members
for emotional support in the aftermath of violence. Those who are not out to
family members would have a hard time talking around the issue. Those who
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bian victims of intimate violence may encounter one, some or all
of these acts of violence.
During the next six months ... I was hit and slapped, often till I was
black and blue. I was picked up and thrown against walls.... I was
physically thrown out of the house in the snow with no shoes or coat. I
had black eyes and fractured fingers. She destroyed things I loved.
She would trap me, not letting me leave the room or the house or the
car until the outburst was over. s
Gay and lesbian batterers also use threats to expose publicly the
victim's sexual orientation, a form of psychological abuse absent
from violent heterosexual relationships. Because of the potential
consequences of this exposure, these threats may be particularly
disabling:
Once they come out, lesbians and gay men risk personal rejection by
others, discrimination, and even violence, all experiences that can
have enduring psychological consequences.... Suffering antigay as-
sault or other overt victimization can create considerable distress, in-
cluding feelings of personal loss, rejection, humiliation, and depres-
sion; agitation, restlessness and sleep disturbances; somatic symptoms
such as headaches and diarrhea; and deterioration in personal
relationships.
49
The pattern of violence and victims' reactions to the vio-
lence appear similar to those researchers have noted in hetero-
sexual battering relationships. 0 As in heterosexual relationships,
the first incident of violence typically does not occur until the
couple has made some sort of commitment, such as living to-
gether. One woman noted: "Throughout our courtship, she was
tender and loving. From the onset of our co-habitation, however,
are out may fear reinforcing stereotypes of the "sicknes" of lesbian relation-
ships and lifestyles.
Nancy Hammond, The Reluctance to Identify Abuse, in NauNG rn- VioLaENc, supra
note 40, at 196.
48 Arlene Istar, The Healing Comes Slowly, in N",No HE VIOLENC, supra note
40, at 165-66.
"Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social
Science Research, 1 LAW & SEXUALrrY 133, 147 (1991).
11 Since there are no empirical studies on gay or lesbian battering similar to those of
Walker, Browne or Blackman, this Note is limited to the personal accounts of abuse
victims presented in books and other accounts published in newspapers or magazines.
While the personal accounts do appear to substantiate a conclusion that the pattern and
effects of lesbian and gay intimate violence are similar to those of heterosexual intimate
violence, this hypothesis requires testing in a clinical setting.
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physical violence erupted." 51 Another battered lesbian wrote:
"Sue and I were living together maybe three days when we were
in the bedroom and she became angry and hit me." 2 This is
significant because it makes it more difficult for the victim to
abandon the relationship.
5 3
Once the violence has begun, it appears to follow a progres-
sion similar to that noted in violent heterosexual relationships,0 4
increasing in frequency and severity as the relationship
progresses:
As time went on, X's explosions increased in frequency and they got
closer and closer to being physically abusive.... [S]he did, in fact, try
to choke me one night .... 5
The relationship lasted for eleven years. The violence got worse.... It
became more frequent. Smaller things set it off.... The black and
blue marks got bigger.56
Separation violence-violence that continues after the couple
has terminated the relationship-is also present:
Months later-nearly a year-when she sharply realized that I would
not return to her, she turned her violence away from herself, and on
to me .... When I saw her in person, she physically and verbally
threatened me. She punched my face and hit my body. She shoved
'1 Breeze, supra note 46, at 49.
52 Cory Dziggel, The Perfect Couple, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 63.
Compare BROWNE, supra note 15, at 47 (estimating that 73 to 85 percent of battered
women do not experience violence until after they have made a major life commitment
such as marriage or co-habitation).
11 BROWNE, supra note 15, at 42 ("The longer the couple is involved and the more
serious their commitment, the more likely they are to remain together after a physical
attack.").
' Winfield, supra note 40, at E3. "The [gay or lesbian] couple goes through what
psychologists term a cycle of violence. There's the honeymoon period when everything's
wonderful. Then there's the neutral phase when tension builds up, resentments fester
and they do little talking. Then the batterer explodes and the abuse begins." Id. (inter-
view with Mark Michael, Clinical Psychologist specializing in homosexual batterers and
victims); Lydia Walker, Battered Women's Shelters and Work with Battered Lesbians,
in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 76 ("Lesbian batterers have the classic 'hon-
eymoon phase' of remorse and promises that serve to control the battered woman from
leaving or seeking help, and they both use violence/threat and pity/help me behavior to
try to keep the woman with them.").
" Sarah, Letting Out the Secret, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 117.
"' Dziggel, supra note 52, at 65. Compare BROWNE, supra note 15, at 68 (estimating
that 80 percent of the women in the homicide group, and 58 percent of the women in the
comparison group, reported that the violence worsened during the course of the
relationship).
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me. She harassed me on the phone. One night I returned home from
work to find my apartment destroyed; all of my clothes slashed to
ribbons, my piano seriously damaged, precious items destroyed or sto-
len, plants massacred.
5 7
The physical and psychological reactions of gay or lesbian
victims are also similar to heterosexual victims. Some victims:
leave and return a number of times;"8 blame themselves for the
violence;6 9 experience a sense of low self-esteem; 0 remain emo-
tionally attached to the batterer despite the violence;0' or use
17 Cormier, supra note 47, at 127. Compare BROWNE, supra note 15, at 115-16 (' The
point of, or even the discussion of, separation is one of the most dangerous times for
partners in a violent relationship. Abusive men threatened with the loss of their mates
may be severely depressed, angry, agitated, homicidal or suicidal."). Some studies indi-
cate that the level of violence continues to escalate after separation. Id. at 114. According
to the Department of Justice, a separated or divorced woman is 14 times more likely to
be the victim of a violent crime perpetrated by an ex-spouse than is a married woman
who remains in the abusive household. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFAxRrrTNr oF
JusTicE. FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMS 5 (1991) [hereinafter FsMju VICTIMS OF
VIOLENT CRIMES].
'" See Istar, supra note 48, at 168 ("I left her not once but many times. In a two-
year period, I moved back in with her three different times."); Cedar Gentlewind, Will It
Never End?, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 45 ("Within a month and a half
of being battered I was again going with Amy. I don't remember exactly what she said
that brought me back, but I do know that she said she loved me and wanted me to give
her another chance.").
59 See Hart, supra note 42, at 185. "Batterers always see themselves as the victims
of the battered woman. This perceived victimization is repeatedly shared with the bat-
tered woman .... [B]attered lesbians may continue 'taking care of' the batterer by
blaming herself, maximizing her violence and minimizing that of the batterer." Id. Com-
pare Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Under-
standing the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WAsH. L REv 267, 289 (1985). "Batter-
ers are also quite remarkable in their ability to externalize and rationalize their acts. The
most obvious and frequent target of blame is, of course, his victim. Naturally his blame
feeds right into her guilt. Consequently, they both blame her for the battering." Id.
o Winfield, supra note 40, at E3. "'For male victims [of same-sex intimate vio-
lence], the beating reaffirms that sense of low-self-esteem. If a person is already feeling
bad about themselves, when they get beat up, it's like a self-fulfilling prophecy that they
aren't worth much."' Id. (quoting Mark Michael, Clinical Psychologist specializing in
homosexual batterers and their victims).
61 See Dziggel, supra note 52, at 65. "What was crazy about all of this [violence] was
that since I wanted the relationship to work, I wanted it to last more than anything else.
I thought that as long as we could fight and get back together again and work it out
laughing at ourselves for the craziness of what had happened, we would come closer to-
gether and that somehow the relationship would improve." Id. Compare BROWN, supra
note 15, at 80-81. "[E]specially in the early stages of an abusive relationship, women will
often try harder and harder to meet their mates' needs, looking to themselves for solu-
tions to the others' distress .... Women in the homicide group said they felt like they
would be 'deserting' the man in leaving him, or even in thinking about leaving him,
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force in self-defense. Again, as in heterosexual relationships,
some victims may react in all or a few of these ways.
It should be noted that the issue of victims' retaliatory acts
of self-defense, commonly referred to as mutual battering, has
received much more attention in the gay and lesbian community
than in the heterosexual community.6 3 Due to the heterosexual
community's relative silence on mutual battering, many gay and
lesbian victims of intimate violence do not identify themselves
as battered because they fought back. 4 Studies of heterosexual
battering have shown, however, that up to forty-nine percent of
all battered women fight back on occasion. 5 Thus, being defined
as a battered person is not dependent upon total complacency,
although experts on battered woman's syndrome often leave this
impression.
B. Social and Legal Treatment of Gay and Lesbian Victims of
Intimate Violence
Despite these similarities, gay and lesbian victims of abuse
do not share the same access to services, protection by law en-
forcement or the judicial system, or support from their commu-
nity that battered women receive. Counseling services are availa-
ble in only four cities66 and, while there are approximately 850
although the relationship was becoming destructive to them." Id.
62 BLACKMAN, supra note 15, at 199-200. "The empirical descriptions of battered
women that are currently available are not intended to be wholly applied in each case.
That is, a 'diagnosis' of abuse may be concluded if most, but not all, of the traits shown
to result from abuse are present in some individual." Id.
6 See Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Les-
bian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 578-79 (1990).
" Hart, supra note 42, at 184-85.
65 BROWNE, supra note 15, at 6-9 (citing MURRAY ARNOLD STRAUS, ET AL., BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1980)). Browne notes, however, that
in the Straus study, all of the couples were living together at the time.
It is important to note, however, that when heterosexual couples engage in mutual
battering, the effects of the violence are generally much more severe for one part-
ner-usually the woman. AMA REPORT, supra note 16, at 9. "In combination with men's
greater average physical strength, these factors [of more aggressive, severe and multiple
actions by men as compared to women] lead to quite different physical outcomes for
women and men. Women are much more likely to be injured by their male partners than
men by their female partners." Id. More research needs to be done on whether relatively
equal size between same-sex partners makes any difference in the distribution and sever-
ity of injuries to the person sought to be defined as battered.
66 Winfield, supra note 40, at E3. Specialized counseling services are available for
battered gay men and lesbians in New York City, Minneapolis, Seattle and San
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shelters for battered women and their children nationwide, no
city has an emergency shelter specifically for gay men or lesbi-
ans.67 While a few lesbians are able to use battered women's ser-
vices es gay men do not have this option and thus are affected
even more by the overall lack of services. 69 Recent studies have
linked the availability of services to a decrease in female-perpe-
trated intimate homicide rates.7 Since gay men and lesbians
lack these services it is likely that violence and lethality levels
will remain high.
Police officers and the judicial system have been historically
Francisco.
Judy Mann, A Grant in Trouble, WAsH. PosT, July 5, 1985, at C3.
While some battered lesbians can take advantage of the current domestic violence
network, many apparently face obstacles to both admission and treatment. See Nomi
Porat, Support Groups for Battered Lesbians, in NAw1InG THE VIOLsEac, supra note 40,
at 80 ('No single group of battered women has been rejected from services, disbelieved
and labelled 'divisive' as battered lesbians."). Some commentators have attributed this
problem to homophobia and heterosexism among shelter workers. See Linda Geraci,
Making Shelters Safe for Lesbians, in NA.,nN THE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 77 ("[It
is absolutely vital to work to eliminate homophobia and heterosexism in the shelter envi-
ronment... As long as the word 'lesbian' has the power to produce fear in people,
lesbians in shelter [sic] will not feel totally comfortable.").
Homophobia among government officials also contributes to the lack of available
services and to the fear of some shelter workers that the identification of their shelter
with lesbians will endanger needed funding. See Hammond, supra note 47, at 196. This
feared loss of funding neared realization in 1985 when a Justice Department grant to the
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence ("NCADV") was almost lost after then-
Attorney General Edwin Meese delayed the grant because the group was identified as
being "pro-abortion, pro-lesbian, anti-Reagan radical feminists." Howard Kurtz, Meese
Delayed Grant When Conservatives Balked, WASH PosT, Aug. 9, 1985, at C3 (quoting
Rep. Mark D. Siljander (R-Mich.)). See also Mann, supra note 67, at C3. "'The truth of
the matter is that [NCADVI is a questionable recipient. Many leaders and activists of
that organization have organized prohomosexual and prolesbian sesions trying to make
the case that spousal abuse is somehow inherent in the marriage relationship.'" Id.
(quoting letter from Pat McGuigan, Director of Institute for Government and Politics, to
Edwin Meese). Although the grant was finally approved on August 9, 1985, the NCADV
was forced to downplay the role of lesbians in its organization. Howard Kurtz, Meese
Clears Disputed Grant for Aid to Battered Women, WAsh. PosT, Aug. 10, 1985, at A2.
11 AVP REPORT, supra note 38, at 3. "[Wle remain thwarted in our efforts to iden-
tify satisfactory options for emergency housing and safe shelter for clients seeking to
leave their abusive relationships. This problem is particularly severe for gay men, whose
only option is often New York's homeless shelter system." Id. See also Patricia Nealon,
Domestic Abuse Poses Challenges, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1989, at 1.
70 See Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Exploring the Effect of Resource Availa-
bility and the Likelihood of Female-Perpetrated Homicides, 23 LAw & Soc'" Ray 76, 91
(1989) (showing a high correlation between the 25 percent decrease in female perpetrated
intimate-homicides between the years 1979 to 1984 and the presence of emergency shel-
ters and state domestic violence legislation).
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unresponsive to gay and lesbian intimate violence, leaving vic-
tims without sufficient help from the legal system. Largely as a
result of police indifference, gay and lesbian victims of crime are
generally less likely than heterosexuals to report incidents of vi-
olence to the police." Even if contacted, police downplay the se-
riousness of assaults between gay men and lesbians and often
neglect to arrest the batterer.7 2 As one psychologist noted:
I've heard a lot of horror stories about the police not treating [lesbian
victims] seriously, and really being abusive themselves in terms of giv-
ing the woman a hard time.... That doesn't have so much to do with
the violence itself, but how our society reacts, and how hard it is for
lesbian women who are being battered to get help. 3
Fearing such a police response, and often desiring to remain
closeted, victims see no escape from the violence, thus trapping
71 Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1508, 1542 (1989). But see
AVP REPORT, supra note 38, at 3 (reporting that gay and lesbian victims of crime are no
less likely to report a crime to police than the general population-about 50 percent
reporting). The history of conflict between the police and the gay and lesbian commu-
nity, as well as the history of unprovoked violence by the police against gay men and
lesbians, contributes to gay men's and lesbians' reluctance to report crime. Sexual Orien-
tation and the Law, supra, at 1542. According to one survey of gay men and lesbians in
eight cities, 13 percent of the lesbians and 23 percent of the gay men reported being
victimized by the police due to their sexual orientation. Id. at 1542 n.157 (citing Kevin
T. Berrill, Anti-Gay Violence: Causes, Consequences, Responses 2 (1986) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file at Harvard Law School Library)).
71 Garcia, supra note 37, at E2. Overreliance on the gay and lesbian community by
victims, and their desire not to have the police intervene in the relationship, may also
cause victims to refrain from calling the police for help. Hammond, supra note 47, at
196.
Until recently, battered women also found it difficult to obtain effective police re-
sponse, including the arrest of the batterer. Often the police only attempted to calm the
parties, sometimes separating them for a short period of time, before leaving. Waits,
supra note 59, at 311. However, after a few successful and well-publicized lawsuits by
battered women who were revictimized by their batterers after seeking but failing to
receive adequate police protection, many cities instituted pro-arrest policies that en-
couraged police to arrest batterers. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.
Supp. 1521, 1531 (D.oConn. 1984) (battered woman awarded $2.3 million for injuries
sustained after her husband beat her in front of the police); Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d
582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (New York City Police Department en-
tered into a consent judgment admitting a duty to protect battered women to the same
extent as other victims of violent crimes). See also MARJORY D. FIELDS, NEW YORK STATE
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR POLICE FAIL-
URE TO ARREST IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES (1987) (providing an overview of the federal
and state cases in this area). Arrests have been found to be an effective deterrent to
further abuse in some cases. Waits, supra note 59, at 310.
73 Garcia, supra note 37, at E2 (quoting Valerie Coleman, Psychologist with the Los
Angeles Gay and Lesbian Community Services Center).
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them more deeply in the relationship.
Even when victims succeed in having their batterers ar-
rested or appear in court to request an order of protection,
judges and prosecutors may be unwilling or unable to help the
victim. First, their own negative attitudes concerning gay men
and lesbians may color their ability to act fairly.7 5 Second, be-
cause many court personnel are aware of the popular theories
that base the perpetuation of intimate violence on male and fe-
male gender roles, they may be unable to identify intimate vio-
lence in a gay or lesbian relationship."8 This problem is particu-
larly acute when both parties appear in court and claim to be
battered. While a judge would likely dismiss a man's claim that
he was also battered by his female spouse, the same judge may
assume that both parties in a gay or lesbian relationship are
equally to blame or equally capable of inflicting damage."
Finally, even if police and judges were to react decisively to
gay and lesbian intimate violence, at least sixteen states have
domestic violence laws that do not reach same-sex, non-related
cohabitants.78 Generally, domestic violence laws provide funding
74 BROWNE, supra note 15, at 126. "A lack of adequate provision for safe shelter,
relocation, or protection from further attack contributed to (the battered womens] sense
of entrapment; most women in the homicide group concluded that their only alternative
was to survive within the relationship." Id.
7 See infra notes 13146 and accompanying text (discussing judicial attitudes con-
cerning gay men and lesbians).
7' Robson, supra note 63, at 567. "Many judges and legal officials have been edu-
cated in domestic violence issues in ways which emphasize the dominant/submissive pa-
triarchal arrangement based on objective criteria such as gender." Id. at 579.
" Id. Robson identifies the issue of "mutual battering" as very problematic for
judges and posits that judges confronted with two partners who both claim abuse may
ignore the possibility that one partner's fighting was in self-defense and simply deny
either partner a restraining order or issue a mutual restraining order. For the victim, not
only does this response minimize the violence, but it creates later problems if the bat-
terer attempts to use the restraining order against his/her partner. Id. at 550 & n.56
(listing the potential consequences for violating a temporary restraining order).
"S States that have domestic violence statutes that exclude same-sex, unrelated
couples are: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3601 (1989) C".... opposite sex or... related ...
by consanguity or affinity to the second degree"); DL. CODE ANm tit. 10, § 921 (Supp.
1988) (families only); FLA. STAT. ch. 741.30 (Supp. 1990) (related by blood or marriage
only); Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (family members or unmar-
ried parents of a child); MD. FAhi. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-513 (1984) (only spouses currently
residing together); Micm. STAT. ANN. § 16.611(1) (Callaghan 1988) (opposite sex only);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (1990 Supp.) ("... persons living as spouses.. ."); Mo ANN.
STAT. § 455.010 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (opposite sex only); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206
(1989) (opposite sex only); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1 (1989) (opposite sex only); 0mOo Rv
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for counseling and shelter space, establish information-gathering
systems, and provide for state-sponsored research .7  In some cit-
ies a combination of laws and policies encourage the arrest of
batterers, provide for protective orders, mandate arrest for viola-
tion of those orders, and define certain acts of intimate violence
as felonies.80 States that define domestic violence so as not to
include same-sex, non-related partners effectively bar gay men
and lesbians from these protections.
Finally, unlike most battered women today, many victims of
abuse report being alienated from the gay and lesbian commu-
nity once they publicly acknowledge the abusive relationship.81
One explanation for the community's general unwillingness to
help is that many gay men and lesbians do not believe that vio-
lence occurs in same-sex relationships or that it could be as seri-
ous as it is between a man and a woman.
Ironically, we may be more tempted as lesbians to hold victims re-
sponsible for the physical violence they suffer .... It is hard for our
friends to see us, strong and tough-minded women that we are, as vic-
CODE ANN. § 3113.33 (Baldwin 1989) ("... . person living as a spouse.. ."); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 10182 (1991) ... persons living as spouses .. ."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20
(Law. Co-op. 1985) ("... spouses, former spouses, parents and children, and persons
related by consanguity or affinity within the second degree. . ."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1101 (1989) (opposite sex, blood or marriage, spouses); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228
(Michie 1988) (spouses only); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-2 (Supp. 1990) (".... spouses, persons
living together as spouses, persons who formerly resided as spouses, parents, children
and step-children, or other persons related by consanguity or affinity . . ."). Melanie S.
Griffin, Commission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes (1990) (on file with the Na-
tional Center on Women and Family Law).
79 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 459-a - 459-h (McKinney 1987) (New York
State's Domestic Violence Prevention Act provides funding for shelters, services and in-
formation gathering services.).
8o For example, in addition to New York State's domestic violence law, the New
York City Police Department has a pro-arrest policy. It mandates arrest in certain situa-
tions and discourages police officers from using mediation as a technique. Leonard
Buder, Ward Orders More Arrests in Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1984, at
B20.
81 The response of the local lesbian community to the arrest of my former lover
was demoralizing. Lesbians were upset-even angry-that I had called the po-
lice.... They suggested setting up a meeting between' my former lover and me.
They volunteered to mediate so we could reach an "agreement." I can think of
few crueler demands on a woman who has been attacked than to insist that she
sit down with the attacker and talk things out. I would guess that none of the
lesbians who wanted me to do that would consider demanding such a thing
from a straight woman who has just been attacked by her boyfriend.
Mary Lou Dietrich, Nothing Is the Same Anymore, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra
note 40, at 159-60.
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timns of abuse from partners who may be physically smaller. Paradoxi-
cally, even our friends might buy into the old stereotype that some-
how, women aren't big enough or strong enough to really do each
other damage in a physical fight.82
Gay and lesbian victims who experience rejection from their
community, especially if the rejection is coupled with support
for the batterer, may feel compelled to remain in the relation-
ship and thus suffer continued abuse.
Another explanation for the community's failure to recog-
nize publicly same-sex violence is the fear that acknowledge-
ment will lead to increased derision from the heterosexual com-
munity because it will affirm the homophobic attitude that gay
men and lesbians are sick. 3 Some theorists believe that this fear
is rooted in gay men's and lesbians' own internalized
homophobia8s Internalized homophobia can cause the individ-
ual to be defensive about his or her sexual orientation and thus
unwilling to recognize the problem of same-sex violence even in
the individual's own relationship.8s
Additionally, some legal theorists argue that even if the gay
and lesbian community were to accept the fact of intimate vio-
lence, the issue of same-sex intimate violence should remain iso-
lated from the heterosexual community. Since the heterosexual
model of intimate violence is based on stereotypical gender roles
not applicable to gay men or lesbians, it cannot be reconciled
with violence that occurs between same-sex partners."0 Any reli-
ance on the heterosexist social or legal system is bound to be
unsatisfactory because gay men and lesbians will be unable to
present the abuse as consistent with the heterosexual model.
II. STEREOTYPES AND BIASES THAT AFFECT FAIR ADJUDICATION
When feminists first began advocating the rights of battered
women who killed in the mid-1970s,8 7 they recognized that one
82 Hammond, supra note 47, at 194-95.
Mindy Benowitz, How Homophobia Affects Lesbians' Response to Violence in
Lesbian Relationships, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 200.
Id.; Robson, supra note 63, at 581.
Robson, supra note 63, at 581.
88 Id. at 584-86.
87 The study of intimate violence in general began in the 1960s and was primarily
focused on child abuse. BLACKMAN, supra note 15, at 21. However, because violence be-
tween intimates was then thought to be quite rare, large scale efforts to understand the
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of the most damaging issues for the defense was the way in
which women's cases were affected by stereotypes of and bias
against women in the criminal justice system.8
We developed the legal argument for women's "equal rights to trial,"
which challenged sex-bias in the law of self-defense, based upon our
knowledge of the particular problems women who killed men in self-
defense faced in the criminal justice system: the prevalence of homi-
cides committed by women in circumstances of male physical abuse or
sexual assault; the different circumstances in which men and women
killed; myths and misconceptions in the criminal justice system con-
cerning women who kill as "crazy;" the problems of domestic violence,
physical abuse, and sexual abuse of women and children; the physical
and psychological barriers that prevented women from feeling capable
of defending themselves; and stereotypes of women as unreasonable.89
Stereotypes and anti-woman bias harmed female defendants on
two levels. First, societal expectations of women's role in family
and society had a strong influence on the fact-finder. Second,
the traditional doctrine of self-defense was better suited to men
who killed than to women who killed abusive male partners.
Feminist legal theory was premised at least partially on the
assumption that women could not receive a fair trial if the nega-
tive attitudes of jurors and judges were left unchallenged.90 Un-
less jurors and judges were educated, they would be unable to
view the female defendant's actions as reasonable because their
deliberations and rulings would remain colored by their atti-
tudes. Accepting this premise, feminist scholars worked to de-
velop expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome to convey
the experiences of battered women to the judge and jury.
Similarly, anti-gay bias and stereotypes about gay men and
lesbians, which consistently depict them as aberrant or sick, 1
problem were not made until the late 1970s. BROWNE, supra note 15, at 3. See SUSAN
SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE (1982) (containing a comprehensive history of
the battered woman's movement).
88 Schneider, supra note 36, at 199.
8 Elizabeth Schneider, Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Rights Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 607 (1986).
90 Schneider, supra note 36, at 198.
81 Popular stereotypes and misperceptions about gay men and lesbians have as a
common theme the confusion of gender-roles. A partial list of such beliefs include: gay
men want to be, or look and act like, women (hence the derogatory terms queen, fairy,
girl, sissy, faggot); lesbians want to be, or look and act like, men (hence the derogatory
terms butch, amazon, bulldyke, diesel-dyke, bulldagger); gay men are hysterical when
angry; gay men are child molesters; homosexuality is a psychological illness that can be
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negatively affect the fairness by which their cases are heard and
adjudicated. 2 Judges and jurors often are unable to separate
their attitudes about the defendant's sexual orientation from the
defendant's actions. Gay men's and lesbians' actions may be un-
reasonable simply because they are not "like us." Furthermore,
contemporary laws aimed at gay men and lesbians give an aura
of acceptability to disparate treatment. Like battered women
who killed, gay men and lesbians must first find a method to
challenge these attitudes to present their cases to fair and im-
partial fact-finders.
A. The Female Defendant: Facing Decades of Gender-Bias
Woman abuse has a long history of acceptance by both the
social and legal communities. Early English and American com-
mon law condoned wife-beating under the assumption that a wo-
man was the property of her husband. 3 Even after the majority
cured; gay men (and to a lesser extent lesbians) neither desire nor can attain long-term
or permanent relationships; the gay and lesbian lifestyle threatens the family; and gay
men and lesbians wish to convert heterosexuals to homosexuality. See Herek, supra note
49, at 138-72 (providing a detailed list of popular stereotypes affecting gay men and les-
bians and offering a sample of the current social science theories tending to refute these
stereotypes).
92 Stereotypes pervade the courts. See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 427 So. 2d 283, 285 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (prosecution was permitted to refer to the defendant as a "bull-
dagger" and explain what the term meant); Constant A. v. Paul C. A., 4986 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (custody case) ("[T]he father and mother have sheltered the children
from this knowledge [that their mother is a lesbian], and by doing so, insinuated that the
mother's behavior is unacceptable. To reverse this will require the children to accept
their mother's role, and to some extent, to proselytize the children by indicating that
because of this role model now found acceptable, it is a suitable life style for children,
particularly Andrea [the daughter]."); Bennett v. State, 677 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) (during the punishment phase of the gay defendant's trial for sexual abuse,
the prosecutor argued that the jury should consider that the defendant's conduct may
induce the victim to become gay); see also Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced
Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 799, 805 (1979); RICHARD MOHR. GAY/JusTca" A STUDY OF ETHIcs, Socima. AND LAV
21-45 (1988) (discussing the effects of the legal community's negative views of gay men
and lesbians).
93 Elizabeth Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of
Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L L REV. 623, 627 (1980). See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me.
304 (1877) (women were not permitted to sue their spouses for any assault committed
during marriage); Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 158 (1824) (finding that pros-
ecutions for wife-beating were "vexatious ... resulting in the discredit and shame of all
parties involved"); State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 162, 86 Am. Dec. 436 (1864) (finding
that unless there is some permanent injury or the violence is excesssive, husbands and
wives should be induced to make up and live together); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.
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of states reclassified wife-beating as an assault,94 prevailing no-
tions of the sanctity and inviolability of the family continued to
impede women who sought assistance from the legal system 5 It
was not until the mid-1970s, when feminists moved the previ-
ously private act of violence into the public spotlight, that the
government began to respond to the needs of battered women. 0
Not only does a battered woman on trial for killing her abu-
sive spouse face this historic acceptance of wife-beating by the
legal system, she also confronts the social stereotypes of woman-
hood that may be held by judge and jury. 7 Influenced by their
notions of an ideal female role model, fact-finders often fail to
perceive the individual defendant independent of conclusions
about how women are supposed to act. A woman who commits a
violent act against her husband threatens jurors' sense of order
and security because, by destroying the family unit, she repudi-
ates her natural role as a caring, nurturing mother/wife 8 Fur-
Law) 445 (1868) (under the common law Rule of Thumb, the court refused to punish a
husband because he had beaten his wife with a stick smaller than the diameter of his
thumb and because the court did not want to interfere with the sanctity of the family).
91 By 1910, 35 out of 46 states had passed reform legislation classifying wife-beating
as an assault. MICHAEL DOWD, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE, BATTERED WOMEN: A PERSPECTIVE ON INJUSTICE 5 (1991) (available from
the New York State Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence).
93 Even today, some states offer certain forms of abuse limited immunity from pros-
ecution because they occur within the family unit. For example, 27 states still have a
limited exemption from prosecution for marital rape. In most cases, marriage or cohabi-
tation is a defense to a charge of rape. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. § 11-41.432 (1989); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103-09 (Michie 1987); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401-09 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 53-67(b), 53a-70b (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 761, 773-75 (1987);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-733, 707-734 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1989); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38 para. 12-13 to 16, -18(c) (Smith-Hurd 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.035 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1990); LA. REV.. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:41-:43 (West 1979); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 27-464(D)(c) (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 566.030 (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-403(1) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT,
§ 200.373 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2, -A:3, -A:6 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(2), (G), 2907.12(A)(2), (C) (Anderson 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN,
§ 18.2-61(B) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 44.010, 9A.44.040 to 9A.44.060 (West
1984). NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION: STATE
BY STATE CHART (1991) (available from the National Center on Women and Family Law).
g BLACKMAN, supra note 15, at 9-13.
9 Schneider, supra note 93, at 624-27.
' Mather, supra note 46, at 561 (The woman's violence is "antithetical to [the
jury's] traditional notions of 'feminine.'..: iT]he criminal law and society [would] more
readily excuse a man for killing his wife's paramour than excuse a woman for killing her
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thermore, the jurors' own conceptions of the family as a safe,
healthy environment may lead them to deny the existence of
violence altogether. 99 Rather than believe the woman, jurors
choose to believe their own stereotype.
Stereotypes of women's passivity, submissiveness and un-
reasonableness skew the jurors' perception of female defend-
ants.100 Jurors who harbor such stereotypes find it difficult to
reconcile their image of the good/healthy/passive woman with
the battered woman defendant who is on trial precisely because
she was aggressive, and therefore "unfeminine" and "bad." 01
Prosecutors often highlight these stereotypes to discredit the
woman and her response to the violence. Defense attorneys in
turn respond by playing up more sympathetic stereotypes:
[P]rosecutors' attacks on the defendants as women included portray-
ing them as evil, discrediting their performances as wives and/or
mothers, and reproaching them for inappropriate emotional responses.
In one case the prosecutor described the defendant to the jury as a
"nefarious, scheming, conniving, rotten, heartless, bloodthirsty, moral-
ist, hardened, murdering rat .... " [The defense countered] with a
description of the 23-year old defendant as a "little girl," once stating
"she's a nice little girl and everything, but she's not a genius."'I
Finally, like stereotypes of women in general, mispercep-
tions about intimate violence, deeply rooted in our cultural no-
tions of the woman's place in society, make it difficult for jurors
rapist.").
9' Schneider, supra note 93, at 630 ("[J]uror denial of the problem of woman abuse
is common because denial 'allows a person to continue to hold on to the image of the
family as an institution of love, nourishment, and protection.' ") (quoting Affidavit of Pat
Murphy in support of motion for jury questioning and expert testimony, State v. Brinker
No. 30842 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Oct. 3, 1978).
100 Schneider, supra note 93, at 628 (" 'Healthy' women are expected to be aepen-
dent, passive and submissive; 'healthy' men are encouraged to be aggressive, competitive
and dominant."). These stereotypes also may affect the way battered women react to
violence. Mather, supra note 46, at 565 ("Most women are socialized to be somewhat
passive and nonaggressive, to get along, and to keep peace. These feminine traits are
frequently more pronounced in the battered woman."). But see infra note 200 and ac-
companying text (arguing that battered women are active in their effort to survive within
the relationship).
10! Phyllis Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 136 (1985).
102 Pamela Jenkins & Barbara Davidson, Battered Women in the Criminal Justice
System: An Analysis of Gender Stereotypes, 8 BEHAv. SCL & L. 161, 164 (1930) (citation
omitted).
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to appreciate the impact violence has on the individual.10 3 Com-
mon myths about intimate violence include the belief that
women provoke violence and therefore deserve to be beaten;104
women stay in abusive relationships because they are masochis-
tic and voluntarily participate in the violence; 05 flight from the
abusive household ends the violence; 06 husbands or boyfriends
have a right to strike their partners; police adequately protect
battered women; battered women are in abusive relationships
because they are psychologically imbalanced; women who kill
their abusers are crazy; and only poor, uneducated women are
beaten.10 7 A juror who holds any of these beliefs unchallenged is
less likely to understand the woman's act of self-defense or per-
ceive it as reasonable.
Added to these gender stereotypes is the bias embodied in
the traditional doctrine of self-defense. 0 At common law a de-
103 Although these myths are outlined here with respect to heterosexual women,
most of the assumptions about intimate violence will also affect gay and lesbian defend-
ants. However, it is important to be aware of the way in which the defendant's sexual
orientation may influence the way the jurors think about the myths. For example, jurors
who believe the myth that homosexuality itself is a form of mental illness, may assume
that gay or lesbian intimate violence is a natural part of the deviant relationship. Herek,
supra note 49, at 138-43.
104 See State v. Crigler, 598 P.2d 739, 740 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) ("Their life to-
gether was often stormy; and, when provoked, he brutally beat on her on several occa-
sions.") (emphasis added).
101 See People v. Powell, 83 A.D.2d 719, 721, 442 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (3d Dep't 1981)
(prosecutor argued that the defendant was a sexual masochist and that both parties en-
joyed participating in the violence).
106 The question, "Why don't battered women leave?" is based on the assump-
tion that leaving will end the violence. While this may be true for some women
who leave after the first or second incident (these women are rarely identified
as battered, and still less often studied), even the smoothness of those separa-
tions depends on the abuser's sense of desperation or abandonment and his
willingness or tendency to do harm when faced with an outcome he does not
want or cannot control.
BROWNE, supra note 15, at 109-10.
'07 See generally, WALKER, supra note 25, at 18-31 (discussing and refuting myths
about battered women); BROWNE, supra note 15. See also BLACKMAN, supra note 15, at
204-10 (arguing, in response to the myth that most battered women are poor and unedu-
cated, that the focus of most research to date has centered on middle-class battered
women and neglected poor, welfare-class women).
"0I Before the mid-1970s, battered women on trial for killing their abusive spouses
often pled either insanity, diminished capacity or heat of passion. Schneider, supra note
93, at 630. See DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 299, 319, 473-74 (common law definitions of
insanity, diminished capacity and heat of passion). Since these defenses act as theories of
excuse, a woman's action was objectively unreasonable but excused because she "did not
have a fair opportunity to choose meaningfully whether to inflict the harm." Cathryn Jo
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fendant was justified in using deadly force against the victim if,
at the time of its use, the defendant was not the aggressor and
she reasonably believed that such force was necessary to combat
imminent, unlawful deadly force by the victim. 09
Women traditionally have great difficulty successfully
pleading self-defense. In part, this is because it is better suited
to its original vision of combat between two male strangers of
equal strength and fighting ability than it is to a woman faced
with a male partner who has used violence against her in the
past.110 For example, the traditional doctrine required the actor
to use only force in proportion to the force being used, or
threatened, against her."' Many women who are smaller, weaker
and/or less skilled in defending themselves than men are unable
to ward off a potentially lethal attack by an unarmed assailant
without the use of a weapon. 12 Strict enforcement of the pro-
portional force rule leads some courts to find that the defendant
could not have acted in self-defense because "a belief that the
decedent unarmed might kill or greatly injure the defendant
while she had a loaded gun [is] unreasonable."' 1 3
Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Bat-
tered Women Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L REv. 11, 22 (1986); DaEssLEa, supra note 23, at 177.
' United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230-31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1007 (1973). See also DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 191-217.
110 Crocker, supra note 101, at 126-28; Mather, supra note 46, at 564-65.
"' Mather, supra note 46, at 656. Prosecutors tend to underemphasize the violence
of the abuser to present the battered defendant's use of force as unreasonable. In People
v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978), the defendant, a battered heterosexual woman ac-
cused of killing her spouse, testified that immediately before the stabbing, her spouse
"grabbed her by the back of her collar and threw her across the bed," twisted her arm to
take away her keys, choked her "with sufficient force to cut off her breath," beat her
"about the face and head," and said, "'[B]itch, you gonna hurt me? I'm going to send
you to your grave."' Id. at 434-35. The prosecutor argued during summation that the
victim "did not deserve to die 'for slapping a woman.'" Id. at 439. The court of appeals
found that "the prosecutor was merely drawing the jury's attention to evidence [that the
defendant's action] was not commensurate with the force ... used against her." Id. The
clear implication is that intimate violence is neither serious nor a real crime; therefore,
women who react against it are hysterical and unreasonable.
'12 Compare BROWNE, supra note 15, at 11 (finding that most battered women who
kill their intimate partners use a weapon, usually a gun) with FL-La VicTiMs OF Vio-
LENT CRIMES, supra note 57, at 6 (finding that 76 percent of the spouses, ex-spouses and
boyfriends who commit violent crimes against their intimate partners use no weapons).
"I People v. Davis, 337 N.E.2d 256 (Il1. App. Ct. 1975). Most courts now permit a
woman to plead self-defense even if she used a weapon against an unarmed assailant.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN NV. Scorr. JR. CRIMINAL LAw 457 (2d. ed. 1986) (asserting
that the modern trend is to permit the court to consider the relative size, strength, gen-
19931
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Similarly, the requirement that the force or threat of force
be imminent disadvantages many women who cannot fight back
during an attack. 114 Modern courts have reinterpreted the immi-
nence requirement somewhat more broadly, permitting the jury
to take into account the defendant's subjective knowledge of the
batterer's past violence and the relative size and strength of the
parties.115 However, many courts continue to find that nontradi-
tional confrontation cases" 6 stretch the concept of imminence
beyond traditional notions of reasonableness." 7
der, the violence of the attack, and the attacker's reputation for violence).
"' Crocker, supra note 101, at 126-27; Mather, supra note 46, at 565-58. Although
the majority of battered women who strike back at their abusers do so during a physical
confrontation, many homicides committed by battered women occur when the spouse is
asleep or has his back turned. Schneider, supra note 93, at 643; Holly McGuigan, Clinical
Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, Lecture on the Defense of
Battered Women Who Kill (Nov. 13, 1990).
115 See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc). Here, the de-
fendant, who was not a battered woman but who knew of the victim's prior violent be-
havior, shot the unarmed victim before any violence had commenced. Id. at 551. The
court found that a jury instruction on imminence which required the jury to consider
only "those acts or circumstances occurring 'at or immediately before the killing' in
determining the reasonableness of the defendant's actions was erroneous and unfair. Id.
at 555 (quoting Jury Instruction No. 10). The court noted:
The impression created-that a 5'4" woman with a cast on her leg and using a
crutch must, under the law, somehow repel an assault by a 6'2" intoxicated
man without employing weapons in her defense, unless the jury finds her de-
termination of the degree of danger to be objectively reasonable-constitutes a
separate and distinct misstatement of the law and, in the context of this case,
violates the respondent's right to equal protection of the law.
Id. at 558.
"' A non-traditional confrontation case is one in which the defendant acts either
before or after a physical confrontation. The most widely used example is a woman who
shoots her sleeping partner.
"' While the definition of imminence varies by jurisdiction, compare State v. Nor-
man, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13 (N.C. 1989) (suggesting that the term "imminence" is synonymous
with "immediate" or "about to happen") with People v. Ariz, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172
(Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1989) (finding that "imminent peril" is "immediate and present and
not prospective or even in the near future"), battered women who have nontraditional
confrontation cases generally have greater difficulty establishing that their belief of im-
minent threat was reasonable. Schneider, supra note 93, at 634-35. For many of these
women, however, the threat of serious bodily injury or death is a continuous threat un-
like a "one-time adversarial encounter" that the traditional notion of imminence presup-
poses. Id. at 634. But see Kerry A. Shad, Comment, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Un-
available to Battered Women Who Kill Passive Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1171
(1990) (arguing that any expanded definition of the imminence requirement would "'cat-
egorically legalize the opportune killing of abusive husbands by their wives solely on the
basis of the wives' testimony concerning their subjective speculation as to the probability
of future felonious assaults by their husbands...' ") (quoting Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 15).
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Despite the greater need for expert testimony in nontradi-
tional cases, judges are more apt to exclude it because they are
unable to perceive the defendant's belief of imminent threat as
reasonable.11" In People v. Aris e19 the defendant shot her sleep-
ing spouse after he told her that "'he didn't think he was going
to let [her] live till the morning.' "120 Here, the court concluded
that expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome was irrele-
vant. While the victim may have presented a serious danger to
the defendant in the near future, "no 'jury composed of reasona-
ble men could have concluded that' a sleeping victim presents
an imminent danger of great bodily harm. ... I, The court
continued:
[W]here... the defendant's own testimony establishes facts tending
to show quite conclusively that there was nothing in the victim's be-
havior indicating the existence of an imminent danger... it is not
reasonably probable that [battered woman's syndrome] testimony will
convince the jury that, nevertheless, the defendant honestly perceived
an imminent danger resulting in a different verdict.In
The circle is vicious: the purpose of expert testimony is to ac-
quaint the judge and jury with unusual phenomena, yet the fur-
ther the defendant's act is from the judge's own experience the
less likely he or she is to admit the testimony.
Finally, many commentators criticize the "reasonable man
standard" as it is applied to women in general and to battered
'" Since expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome is intended to ex-
plain how a battered woman could reasonably perceive danger when others
might not, one would expect the opposite result. This twist suggests that courts
have failed to accept battered women's equal claims of self-defense and have
continued to evaluate women's claims according to male standards.
Crocker, supra note 101, at 139.
119 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1989).
20 Id. at 179.
"I Id. at 176 (emphasis added). The court offers a telling analogy to explain its
position. "The criminal law would not sentence to death a person such as the victim in
this case for a murder he merely threatened to commit, even if he had committed
threatened murders many times in the past and had threatened to murder the defend-
ant." Id. at 174. If any actor claiming self-defense had to abide by the rules governing
the state's authority to execute its citizenry, he or she would be dead by the time no
reasonable doubt had been established. Furthermore, the state is hardly in the Eame
position as a battered person: the state and its law is not a person. The "murderer" doe
not live with the state, does not have visitation rights with the state's children and does
not regularly beat and sexually molest the state.
122 Id. at 181.
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women in particular. "Widespread adherence to the sex-biased
'reasonable-man' standard compounds women's problems: 'in all
that mass of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law
. . . there is no single mention of the reasonable woman.'"123
Since the reasonable man standard envisions male conduct as
the norm, any act by a woman that does not conform to the
male ideal is unreasonable.124 Yet if a battered woman defendant
highlights the typically male aspects of her action and down-
plays the typically female aspects, the jury may punish her for
being unfeminine. Many commentators have suggested that the
only way to avoid this problem is to use another standard for
battered women.12 5 There is no consensus as to what standard
should be used, however. Moreover, there are many theorists
who object to the creation of a special standard for women:
The issue is not the development of a new standard of self-defense for
women, but the adjustment of existing statutes to account for differ-
ences in the experiences of women and men-particularly women
faced with a male assailant, and women who are victims of repeated
violent assaults by one assailant-so that the same standard can be
applied to all victims.
12 6
The combination of these factors, the widely held stereo-
types of women and gender roles and the bias of the traditional
doctrine of self-defense, has led feminist legal theorists to argue
that "someone not a battered woman[] is needed to translate the
experiences of large numbers of women in this society to the rest
of society's representatives. '127 As Professor Elizabeth Schneider
123 Schneider, supra note 93, at 635 (quoting A. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN TIE
COMMON LAW 18 (1930)).
Mz4 Schneider, supra note 93, at 636; see also GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 17 ("The
repeated finding ... is that the qualities deemed necessary for adulthood-the capacity
for autonomous thinking, clear decision-making, and responsible action-are those asso-
ciated with masculinity arid considered undesirable as attributes of the feminine self.").
125 See Schneider, supra note 93, at 639-40 (advocating a sex-neutral or individual-
ized standard that would take into account all circumstances and histories of the actors
and the perceptions of the defendant); Crocker, supra note 101, at 121-51 (advocating a
"reasonable woman standard" to account for the differences in a woman's perception of
danger, harm and force, but noting that this standard could lead to sexual stereotyping
of the kind against which feminist theorists have been arguing); Mather, supra note 46,
at 545 (reviewing and critiquing "reasonable battered woman standard," the "reasonable
woman standard," and the "reasonable sex-neutral standard," and arguing for the adop-
tion of a neutral reasonable woman standard).
126 BROWNE, supra note 15, at 175.
M Schneider, supra note 36, at 218.
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argued:
[T]he battered woman who killed her husband had nobody in the
courtroom who was explaining her actions, who could identify with
her and explain her experience and translate it to the jury.... They
needed somebody else to translate and legitimate it to them because
nobody was "female-bonding" or "battered woman-bonding" with her
in the courtroom. The jury wasn't likely to do that. 2
Absent such translation, jurors and judges are unable to view
the actions of these women as reasonable because the women's
experiences fall beyond their understanding.
B. Gay Men and Lesbians: The Firmly Entrenched Prejudices
of a Heterosexist Legal System
Although the bias that battered gay men and lesbians face
as defendants is somewhat similar to the bias battered women
face in court, it is also broader and more difficult to overcome.
The sexual identity of the gay or lesbian defendant often be-
comes an issue during judicial proceedings. 29 Unlike biases con-
cerning women, however, biased attitudes concerning sexual ori-
entation are, at least in part, publicly sanctioned by laws. These
laws, which are either aimed at or enforced primarily against gay
men and lesbians, reinforce societal attitudes by condoning dis-
parate treatment.130
I" Lesbians, Gays and Feminists at the Bar: Translating Personal Experience into
Effective Legal Argument-A Symposium, 10 WOMEN'S RTs L REP 107, 137 (1983)
(quoting Elizabeth Schneider).
"29 Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1551-52. Evidence of a de-
fendant's sexual orientation is generally inadmissible unless it is at "ksue or a defense is
raised based upon the victim's or the defendant's sexual orientation. See, e.g., Gabrielson
v. State, 510 P.2d 534, 539 (Wyo. 1973) (court reversed defendant's conviction for azsault
and battery with a dangerous weapon after the prosecution impermissibly referred to the
defendant's homosexuality). Even when such evidence is admitted, however, it is often
found to be nonprejudicial or nonreversible error. See, e.g., People v. Mullen, 252 P.2d
19, 22 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1953) (while reference to the defendant's homosexual-
ity was beyond the scope of cross-examination, it was not prejudicial because "this evi-
dence was nothing new"); State v. Sias, 416 So. 2d 1213, 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(while testimony regarding the defendant's homosexuality "severely prejudiced the de-
fendant," it was not reversible error because it was introduced to demonstrate the wit-
ness's bias); Blount v. State, 630 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (evidence of the
defendant's homosexuality did not result in enough prejudice to the defendant to war-
rant a new trial).
1"I See, e.g., Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1520-21 (courts use
sodomy statutes to justify other types of discrimination because gay men and lesbians
are presumed to violate these laws); id. at 1542 n.155 (law enforcement policies and the
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Judges and other court personnel routinely refer to popular
negative attitudes about gay men and lesbians during the course
of proceedings that concern gay or lesbian parties or issues. 3' In
some cases, the discussion of negative attitudes is used to serve
legitimate ends, such as to argue for equal treatment by the
public, courts and legislatures, or to strike down an unfair policy
or law. For example, in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industry
Security Clearance Office 132 the court challenged the stereotypes
that the Defense Department's manual employed as its basis for
requiring gay men and lesbians to endure a more stringent se-
curity clearance procedure:
The Defense Department's unequal treatment of gay people perpetu-
ates the very types of archaic stereotypes that the [Defense Investiga-
tive Services] manual implies and that the equal protection clause at-
tempts to extinguish, e.g. that all lesbians and gay men are
emotionally unstable, sexually perverted, and particularly prone to
blackmail and that homosexuality is deviant sexual behavior parallel
to necrophilia, masochism, and. pedophilia. 13
In some cases, however, negative stereotypes clearly influ-
ence either the presentation of the case to the court or the
judge's own reasoning process. For example, in Constant A. v.
Paul C. A.134 the court refused to grant the biological mother
expanded custody for her children simply because she was a les-
bian. "Here, the father and mother started equal; once the fa-
ther established the mother's lesbian relationship and his own
legitimate and stable heterosexual relationship, a presumption
legality of anti-gay discrimination may make crimes against gay men and lesbians more
violent because such crimes are likely to go unreported and unpunished) (citing Miller &
Humphreys, Lifestyles & Violence: Homosexual Victims of Assault & Murder, QUALITA-
TIVE SOC'Y 169, 179-80 (1980)); MOHR, supra note 92, at 326 (the failure of courts to
extend title VII protection to employers and employees of the same gender causes many
gay men and lesbians to lose their jobs as a result of sexual harassment).
13' Judges have referred to homosexuals or homosexuality as immoral, unacceptable
and a crime against nature, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986); as "im-
moral, indecent, lewd and obscene," Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct.
Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); and sodomy as unnatural, "detestible and
an abominable crime against nature," Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d
1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Miss. CODE ch. 64, art. 12, tit. 7(20) (Hutchinson
1848)), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
132 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1990).
..3 High Tech Gays, 668 F. Supp. at 1377.
134 496 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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arose favoring the preferability of the traditional relation-
ship."I s5 Here, the judge had predetermined the character of the
gay or lesbian party based on social stereotypes and was unable
to apply the neutral standard for custody or visitation
rights-the best interests of the child-fairly. In such court-
rooms the gay or lesbian party bears a substantially greater bur-
den in presenting his or her case.
In other cases the laws or rules used by the court are
facially biased and form a basis for additional discriminatory
treatment by courts. One such example is state sodomy laws.'30
Sodomy laws may specifically prohibit oral-genital and anal-gen-
ital contact, or more generally "unnatural lascivious acts" or
"crimes against nature."'' 37 Currently, of the twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia that have sodomy statutes in ef-
fect,"38 six prohibit such contact only between persons of the
"3 Id. at 7. The court also assumed that the children's mere contact With the
mother would expose them to harmful effects. "Here, the children do not know of the
lesbian relationship of their mother, and it is inconceivable that they would go into that
environment, be exposed to the relationship, and not suffer some emotional disturbance,
perhaps severe." Id. at 8.
136 See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis.
L. REV. 187, 198-201; Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1519.40 (dis-
cussing the history and use of sodomy statutes against gay men and lesbians).
"I Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1520 & n.4. Despite the
vagueness of the terms "unnatural lascivious acts" and "crimes against nature," courts
have upheld these statutes. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam)
(upholding TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1980) which prohibits "crimes against nature");
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding FLA STAT. ANN.
§ 800.02 (1992) which prohibits "abominable and detestable crimes against nature").
Some courts have construed state sodomy laws to reach only anal-genital contact. See,
e.g., State v. Potts, 254 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Ariz. 1953) (an "infamous crime against nature"
does not include oral-genital contact).
138 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982); Aruz. REv STAT, ANN §§ 13-1411 to -1412
(Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN § 800.02 (1992); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Harrison, 1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN STAr. Aw-
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1987); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD CODE ANN CIUIL
LAW §§ 553-54 (1987); MIcH. Core. LAWS §§ 750.158, .338-.338(b) (1979); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.293 (1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo REv STAT § 201.109 (1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, 45-5-505 (1987); NEWy REv STAT- § 201.190 (1987); NC
GEN. STAT. §14.177 (1986); OKLA. STAT tit. 21, § 886 (1981); RI GEM LAWs § 11-10-1
(1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN CODE ANN § 39-2-612
(1982); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(I), 21.06 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN § 76-5-
403 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-361 (Michie 1988). Sexual Orientation and the
Law, supra note 71, at 1519 n.2. Massachusetts' sodomy statute, MAss GEz, L. ch. 272,
§ 34 (1986), was arguably invalidated as applied to private consensual conduct. Com-
monwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1974). Kentucky's sodomy statue,
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510-100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985). was struck dowm as anti-
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same gender."' 9 The constitutionality of these laws was upheld
by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick,4 ° where the
Court found no fundamental privacy right to engage in same-sex
sodomy.''
While sodomy statutes are not routinely enforced against
consenting adults,'42 they are often used as a justification for
other forms of discriminatory treatment based on the assump-
tion that gay men and lesbians violate these laws. For example,
in Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock 43 the court used a
Mississippi sodomy statute to support its finding that a student
newspaper did not have to print advertisements that invited stu-
dents to an off-campus Gay Center. The fact that Mississippi
had a constitutional sodomy statute prohibiting "unnatural in-
tercourse" was a "special reason[] for holding that there was no
abuse of discretion by the editor of [the school paper].'
thetical to the state's interpretation of privacy and equal protection. Kentucky v. Was-
son, 61 U.S.L.W. 2180 (1992).
M" The six states that statutorily prohibit sodomy only between members of the
same sex are Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nevada and Texas. Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law, supra note 71, at 1520 n.5.
140 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
M Commentators have almost uniformly criticized the Court's decision in Hard-
wick. See, e.g., Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1521-40, 1523 n.30;
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §15-21, at 1422-35 (2d. ed. 1988).
Courts, too, have criticized the Supreme Court's argument in Hardwick. See, e.g., Wat-
kins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissent-
ing) ("[A]s I understand our Constitution, a state simply has no business treating any
group of persons as the State of Georgia and other states with sodomy statutes treat
homosexuals .... I believe that the Supreme Court egregiously misinterpreted the Con-
stitution in Hardwick."), different results reached on reh'g., en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361,
1370-71 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that Hardwick must be limited to homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy, but should not apply to other forms of homosexual activity that
are not sodomy); see also Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I can
only hope that here, too, the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and conclude that
depriving individuals of this right to choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate
relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's
history than tolerance of non-conformity could ever do.").
142 See Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1520-21.
" 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).
14 Id. at 1075; see also In re Appeal in Pima Cty. Juvenile Action, 727 P.2d 830
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (court refused the plaintiff's application for adoption because he
was a bisexual and sodomy was against the law); State v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975) (although the court affirmed the defendant's conviction for manslaughter,
it found that the defendant could have introduced evidence of the victims' felonious
approach under a theory of self-defense because sodomy is a felony and the victim was
attempting to engage in sodomy with the defendant); Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209
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Furthermore, as the court in Baker v. Wade"4 0 noted in its
opinion invalidating Texas's sodomy statute, sodomy statutes
negatively affect gay men and lesbians on virtually every level of
daily existence:
[T]he existence of these criminal laws, even if they are not enforced..
does result in stigma, emotional stress and other adverse effects. The
anxieties caused to homosexuals-fear of arrest, loss of jobs, discov-
ery, etc.-can cause severe mental health problems. Homosexuals, as
criminals, are often alienated from society and institutions, particu-
larly law enforcement officials. They do suffer discrimination in hous-
ing, employment and other areas."'
The state's overt message to the public as well as to judges and
jurors is that gay men and lesbians do not conduct their rela-
tionships like heterosexuals and therefore do not deserve the
same treatment under the law that heterosexuals receive.
Another state-endorsed form of discrimination is the failure
of any state to extend the right or privilege of marriage to same-
sex couples. 14 7 While gay men and lesbians may form life-long
partnerships, benefits accorded to married couples by govern-
mental and non-governmental institutions (such as workers'
compensation or life and health insurance) are unavailable to
them.148 Moreover, unmarried couples are subject to discrimina-
tion in areas of housing and zoning regulations, wills, tort claims,
(Tek. Civ. App. 1980) (plaintiff made a prima facie case of slander when two witnesses
overheard the defendant refer to the plaintiff as a homosexual which was per se slander-
ous because sodomy is a crime).
1,5 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.
1984), denied, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1988).
"I' Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1130.
'47 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAw & Sax-
uALrrY 9 (1991) (arguing for the recognition of same-sex marriages); Ruthann Robson &
S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63
Txmp. L. REv. 511, 529 (1990) (discuissing options for lesbians who wish to pursue the
benefits of marital unions such as durable powers of attorney and cohabitation con-
tracts); Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1603-04 (detailing constitu-
tional arguments for same-sex marriages and outlining the legal and social problems that
burden unmarried persons).
14S While marriage forms the basis for a number of social benefits, the legal benefits
that accrue from it are equally, if not more, important. In addition to tax benefits, mar-
ried persons may benefit from life and health insurance policies, workers' compensation
benefits or immigration status laws. See Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the
Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAw & SFxuALrrY 97 (1991); Hunter, supra note 147, at 19-27;
Robson & Valentine, supra note 147, at 514; Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra
note 71, at 1611-23.
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and adoption and custody cases. 49
States claim that the prohibition of same-sex marriage en-
courages procreation and promotes traditional values. s0 Some
commentators argue that the true rationale behind this justifica-
tion, and perhaps behind many anti-gay and lesbian attitudes, is
the fear that recognition of same-sex marriages will further
break down the artificial gender roles upon which our society is
constructed. As one commentator argued: "Same-sex marriage
could create the model in law for an egalitarian kind of interper-
sonal relation, outside the gendered terms of power, for many
marriages. At the least, it would radically strengthen and dra-
matically illuminate the claim that marriage partners are pre-
sumptively equal.' 151 Other commentators are less hopeful about
the effect of recognition of same-sex marriages. They argue that
the gender roles upon which society is constructed can never be
broken down. Marriage, as a reflection of these gender roles, will
only force gay men and lesbians to "hetero-relationalize" their
relationships. 52 In either case, the prohibition against same-sex
marriage indicates the power that model gender roles have over
society's construction of proper and improper behavior.
Institutionalized discrimination also helps to create an at-
mosphere that is conducive to anti-gay violence or "queer-
bashing":
Due to the pervasive social disparagement of homosexuality and the
continued legality of many forms of anti-gay discrimination, many gay
and lesbian victims are reluctant to report acts of violence against
them, perhaps out of fear that their sexual orientation will be exposed
' See Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1612-18 (housing and
zoning discrimination may emanate from "exclusionary zoning laws, restrictive statutory
provisions, discriminatory landlord practices, and narrow judicial constructions of the
meaning of 'family' "); Robson & Valentine, supra note 147, at 514-21 (discussing meth-
ods of contract formation that may better enforce a lesbian testator's plans to dispose to
her partner).
o50 Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1609 & nn.40-41 (citing cases
where states have argued both justifications).
"' Hunter, supra note 147, at 17.
152 The transformation'of lesbianism by participation in marriage will not be
positive; it will demarcate acceptable lesbian relationships and sexualities from
unacceptable ones and it will hetero-relationize lesbianism. Perhaps rather
than advocating that marriage be available to lesbians, lesbian legal theory
should advance the proposition that marriage should be abolished as a sexist,
heterosexist, and narrow institution.
Robson & Valentine, supra note 147, at 540.
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.... As a result of their reluctance to report crimes, and their distrust
of the criminal justice system, gay men and lesbians are more attrac-
tive victims for perpetrators of bias crimes.'
5 3
At least one study has suggested that gay men and lesbians are
victimized more often than any other minority group.'" Accord-
ing to the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Pro-
ject, there were 507 reported incidents of bias-motivated crimes
in New York City in 1990, an increase of sixty-five percent from
1989. 5 Approximately seventy percent of these assaults re-
.sulted in injuries serious enough to require medical attention.' 6
Such bias crimes are only one indication of the deep-seated ani-
mosities that many individuals, including jurors, feel toward gay
men and lesbians.157
This combination of biased laws, biased attitudes of judges
and court personnel, and the overall presence of prejudice and
discrimination by society, creates an almost insuperable barrier
to same-sex couples seeking equal treatment. When placed
against a backdrop of intimate violence, these negative attitudes
are magnified even further. Fact-finders are asked to determine
the defendant's reasonableness in a situation often alien to
them: the defendant is both battered and is gay or lesbian. As
feminist theorists surmised in the late 1970s, a determination of
reasonableness made from this uneducated vantage point is
likely to be fraught with erroneous assumptions created by ju-
rors to fill gaps in their understanding of the defendant's experi-
' Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 71, at 1541-42.
154 Id. at 1541 (citing Peter Finn & Taylor McNeil, The Response of the Criminal
Justice System to Bias Crime: An Exploratory Review 1 (1987) (on file at Harvard Law
School Library).
'5 AVP REPORT, supra note 38, at 1. There were 308 such reported crimes in 1939.
Since the Project relies on self-reporting, these figures represent only crimes reported to
the Project. AVP estimates that reports are filed in less than 50 percent of the cases. Id.
at 3.
158 Id.
157 The public's reaction against lifting the historic ban against gay men and lesbi-
ans in the military, and the close votes in 1992 in several states and cities on the issue of
gay and lesbian civil rights are additional evidence of continued animosity toward gay
men and lesbians. See Adam Clymer, Hearings Could Sway the Debate on Gay Troops,
N.Y. Ti's, Feb. 1, 1993, at 14 (indicating that 48 percent of the public disfavors lifting
the military ban); Jeffery Schmalz, The 1992 Elections: The States-The Gay Issues;
Gay Areas Are Jubilant Over Clinton, N.Y. TIEs, Nov. 5, 1992, at 8 (reporting the
passage of anti-gay legislation in Colorado and Tampa, Florida, and the rejection, by a
close vote, of similar legislation in Oregon and Portland, Maine).
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ence. Here, too, someone is needed to translate the battered gay
or lesbian defendant's experiences to society's representatives.
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY ON INTIMATE VIOLENCE
Since the late 1970s the "someone" to translate the exper-
iences of the battered woman has been an expert in the field of
battered woman's syndrome. Although diverse trial strategies
are advocated by feminist legal theorists, such as permitting an
especially credible defendant to testify without additional aid,'51.
the admission of expert testimony has become the focal issue in
battered woman's cases for most courts,"6 9 commentators' and
the media.' 6'
Despite the overall acceptance of such testimony by courts,
some commentators have recently begun to criticize the way the
testimony is given, heard and used. In particular, the fact that
most experts who give testimony rely on one theory, that of Dr.
Lenore Walker, has given rise to much debate about whether
testimony that is based on a monolithic theory ultimately hurts
women's self-defense cases as much as it helps them.
Criticisms of the current use of expert testimony on bat-
tered woman's syndrome in women's self-defense cases are im-
portant to gay and lesbian defendants for two reasons. First,
they are likely to encounter the same problems with certain as-
pects of the Walker model that heterosexual women have en-
countered. Battered defendants who fought back on occasion,
who were equal economic partners in the relationship or who do
not exhibit most of the "symptoms" of battered woman's syn-
Schneider, supra note 93, at 646.
"' Schneider, supra note 36, at 196-97. For cases where courts have admitted and
excluded expert testimony, see infra note 181.
160 See generally BLACKMAN, supra note 15; Crocker, supra note 101; David S.
Dupps, Note, Battered Lesbians: Are They Entitled to a Battered Woman Defense?, 29
J. FAM. L. 879 (1990-91); Schneider, supra note 93; Mather, supra note 46; Shad, supra
note 117. For a comprehensive list of law review articles on the battered woman's self-
defense work through 1986, see Schneider, supra note 36, at 196 n.5.
"I See generally Gerald Caplan & Murray N. Rothbard, Battered Wives, Battered
Justice, NAT'L REV., Feb. 25, 1991, at 39; Amy Margolick, When Battered Wives Kill
Does the Law Treat Them Fairly, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1985, at C8; Susan Paterno, A
Legacy of Violence, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, at El; Use of Experts in Battering is
Upheld on Women's Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1984, at Al; Nancy Watzman & Wil-
liam Saletan, Marcus Welby, J.D.: When Doctors Become Judges, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr.
17, 1989, at 19; Anne Wyman, Murder Acquittal is Advanced in Battered-Woman De-
fense, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1989, at 33. See also Schneider, supra note 36, at 197 n.8.
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drome, may find the judge and jury unsympathetic. They may
eiren be excluded from presenting evidence on the prior
violence. 62
Second, gay men and lesbians may find that the tradition-
ally feminist language and images that are an integral part of
the history of battered woman's syndrome will be used against
them by attorneys, judges and jurors. Basic theories about inti-
mate violence-that it results from the historic position of
women as property in a patriarchal structure or that women are
battered because they are smaller and weaker-do not translate
to same-sex relationships. Yet without some form of expert testi-
mony, gay men and lesbians will find themselves in the same
position as battered women in the pre-1970s when firmly held
beliefs about women and intimate violence made self-defense an
inviable option.1 63
A. Expert Testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome
Feminist legal theorists developed the idea of using an ex-
pert on intimate violence "to educate the judge and jury about
the common experiences of battered women, to explain the con-
text in which an individual battered woman acted, so as to lend
credibility and provide a context to her explanation of her ac-
tions."8 64 At the time the theories on women's self-defense cases
were developed, few researchers in the scientific community
2I In self-defense cases, however, evidence of prior violence usually will be admissi-
ble, even without expert testimony on intimate violence. See, e.g., State v. Maclillian,
64 So. 2d 856 (La. 1953); State v. Crigler, 598 P.2d 739 (Wash. 1979). In both cases,
where expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome was unavailable or not used, the
appellate courts reversed the trial courts' exclusion of evidence of prior specific acts of
violence by the victim. Without expert testimony, however, the fact-finder is given no
explanation of the impact of the violence on the battered victim and is presented with no
evidence to challenge the fact-finder's own stereotypes of intimate violence or same-sex
relationships.
16 The decision to present expert testimony in any intimate violencelself-defense
case must be made in light of the defendant's circumstances. Some defendants' cases
may be better suited to a defense based on insanity, diminished capacity or "heat of
passion." As feminist theorists have advised attorneys since the creation of expert testi-
mony on battered woman's syndrome, blind reliance on the expert's testimony may lead
to poor results. "[E]xpert testimony not clearly tied to the individual ... defendant's
circumstances and perspective should be used with care.... TMhe use of expert wit-
nesses is often prudently foregone, especially where the defendant is credible and articu-
late." Schneider, supra note 93, at 646.
'16 Schneider, supra note 36, at 201.
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were working with battered women. As a result, much of the
early research feminist legal theorists relied upon was the work
of Dr. Lenore Walker. 16 Even today, despite the number of re-
searchers who have published in the area of intimate violence
and battered women, the great majority of experts who testify in
these cases still rely on Walker's model of battered woman's
syndrome.166
Walker's theory consists of two distinct parts: first, a cycle
theory of violence that describes the typical course of violent be-
havior in a relationship;1 7 second, the social learning theory of
learned helplessness to explain why battered women often fail to
leave abusive relationships. 168 The cycle consists of three phases:
(1) the tension building phase, characterized by minor abusive
' See WALKER, supra note 25. Although a few researchers published before
Walker, she was the first to offer an integrated explanation for violence in the home and
its effects on victims. The majority of writers at that point were concerned with docu-
menting the existence and extent of intimate violence in America. See, e.g., R. EMERSON
DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979); R. GELLES, THE VIOLENT
HOME (1972); ROGER LANGLEY & RICHARD LEVY, WIFE BEATING (1977); DEL MARTIN, BAT-
TERED WIVES (1976); ERIN PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (1974)
(Pizzey, who wrote about battered women in England, is credited with having written
the first book on intimate spousal violence); SUZANNE STEINMETZ, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
(1977); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN (1978); VIOLENCE IN THE
FAMILY (Suzanne Steinmetz & Murray Arnold Straus eds., 1974).
166 Schneider, supra note 36, at 202; Shad, supra note 117, at 1166 n.53. Cases in
which courts have recited Walker's model include: Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Gindorf, 512 N.E.2d 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (Walker
testified both to battered woman's syndrome and mental illness), cert. denied sub nom.,
486 U.S. 1011 (1988); State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563 (Kan. 1986), overruled by State v.
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v.
Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811
(N.D. 1983); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1985); State
v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985), rev'd, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165
(Wash. 1988); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Buhrle v. State, 627
P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
167 WALKER, supra note 25, at xiv.
168 Id. at 42-54; LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); Schnei-
der, supra note 93, at 202; Shad, supra note 117, at 1167; Waits, supra note 59, at 282.
The theory of learned helplessness was first developed in 1975 during research on animal
behavior. In laboratory experiments dogs were given random electric shocks. Initially,
the dogs attempted to control their environment to stop the shocks. But once they real-
ized the futility of their attempts, the dogs became passive and compliant. Eventually,
they made no attempts at escape, even when guided to an escape route. See SELIGMAN,
HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEATH 21-44 (1975).
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incidents;169 (2) the acute battering phase, characterized by the
abuser's severe uncontrollable explosion of violence; 17 0 and (3)
the contrite, loving phase, characterized by the batterer's apolo-
getic and caring behavior.17 1 It is during the third phase that a
woman is most likely to leave her abuser. 72 However, it is also
the point at which she is most vulnerable to his apologies and
least able to plan an escape.17 3
Walker applied the theory of learned helplessness in an ef-
fort to explain the often-asked question, "Why don't battered
women leave?' 74 At first, Walker theorized, a battered woman
I'9 WALKER, supra note 25, at 56-59. Women may characterize an incident or a se-
ries of incidents as minor abuse, even though serious injury resulted. A person's percep-
tion of the violence as minor or extreme depends upon her own history of violence. If she
has been a member of an abusive household where fists or objects are routinely thrown,
she may consider a slap to be minor. If she has not had a history of violence, however, or
the prior violence was relatively noninjurious, she may view a slap as a serious assault.
Waits, supra note 59, at 292 n.136. Since the frequency and severity of violence tends to
escalate over time in abusive relationships, BROWNE, supra note 15, at 105-07, and be-
cause the victim, especially one with a long history of abuse, tends to minimize both the
severity and frequency of violence, a woman may report incidents of extreme violence as
minor. BROWNE, supra note 15, at 7.
170 WALKER, supra note 25, at 65-70. While the tension-building phase may be very
long, lasting weeks, months or even years, the acute battering phase tends to last only 2
to 24 hours. Id. at 60 & 69. The effects of the violence, however, can be very serious. See
supra n otes 37-65 and accompanying text on typical violence. Typical injuries include
bruises, lacerations, contusions, puncture wounds, broken bones and death. BRowNE,
supra note 15, at 69.
,71 WALKER, supra note 25, at 65-70. The length of the contrite, loving phase may
vary from couple to couple, and also may not remain constant in any one relationship. As
the relationship progresses and the violence escalates, the time between the contrition
phase and the tension-building phase generally decreases. Id. at 59. Browne reports in
her study of battered women who kill their intimate partners that while nearly all bat-
terers (87 percent) expressed some remorse after the initial violent episode, the percent-
age of men who did so dropped sharply (to 58 percent after the worst incident) as the
relationship progressed. BROWNE, supra note 15, at 62-64.
172 WALKER, supra note 25, at 66; Waits, supra note 59, at 294.
1 BROWNE, supra note 15, at 111.
Women in the homicide group showed a marked tendency to withdraw from
outside contacts immediately after an abusive incident, rather than attempting
to escape or take action against the abuser.... They also tended to underesti-
mate the "damage". .. and, at least early in their relationships, entertained the
unrealistic hopes for improvement of the abuser's behavior or of the relation-
ship in the future.... As the violence escalated in frequency and severity, the
women's perceptions of alternatives for escape became increasingly limited,
and taking action on any of those alternatives seemed too dangerous to pursue.
Id. at 126.
174 Browne identifies this question as probably the most frequently asked about bat-
tered women. BROWNE, supra note 15, at 109. In partial response, Browne notes that the
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attempts to control the abusive incidents by identifying the
cause of the attack and modifying her behavior accordingly.'", If
the behavior modification results in a desired outcome (the ab-
sence of violence), she attempts to replicate the behavior to re-
create the outcome. 176 Abuse, however, tends to be both inter-
mittent and unpredictable. 17 7  When a woman experiences
violence despite her modified behavior, she begins to assume
that she has no control over her environment. 178 This constant
sense of lack of control causes the woman to lose self-esteem and
to become docile and passive. 17 Even during periods of relative
calm she is unable to act. The resultant psychological state is
what is known as "battered woman's syndrome."1 s0
Expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome has been
ruled admissible by the majority of courts that have addressed
the issue."s l Even when accepted, however, many courts have
question is based on the erroneous assumption that separation will end the violence.
Furthermore, "[a]nother way to look at -the issue is to ask, 'Why should the woman
leave?' Why should the victim and, possibly, her children hit the road like fugitives,
leaving the assailant the home and belongings, when he is the one who broke the law?"
Id. at 110.
175 WALKER, supra note 25, at 58; see also BROWNE, supra note 15, at 52 ("A con-
crete reason for an unexpected attack is comforting; women often attempted to adapt
their behavior in light of the reasons given [by their spouses for the abuse], in an effort
to prevent further trouble.").
176 WALKER, supra note 25, at 44-45.
17Although a batterer will often claim to have been provoked by a particular event
or by the victim's failure to perform a task properly, the reason given is often outside the
victim's control (he failed to get an expected raise) or out of proportion to the perceived
slight (she forgot to buy ham at the store). Attempts to avoid violence in such cases are
bound to be futile. BROWNE, supra note 15, at 52.
178 WALKER, supra note 25, at 45.
179 [A] destructive psychological spiral is established; the beatings lead to low-
ered self-esteem and learned helplessness, which in turn make her unable to
escape; her inability to escape makes her feel even more inadequate and help-
less and also leaves her in a relationship which will lead to further beatings,
which will further decrease her self-esteem.
Waits, supra note 59, at 283.
180 When first used by Walker, however, the word "syndrome" was meant to de-
scribe the whole of the abusive relationship, both the cycle of violence and the physical
and psychological effects on the victim. WALKER, supra note 25, at xiv. Therefore, ini-
tially the word "syndrome" focused not just on the woman but on the perpetrator of the
violence. However, the way in which the expert testimony on battered women now is
used focuses on the woman and her psychological state, rather than the cause of the
violence, the batterer. See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text (criticizing expert
testimony on the syndrome by feminist legal scholars).
"I Many courts have found expert testimony to be admissible: Ibn-Tamas v. United
States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989);
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limited the testimony of the expert or have limited the extent to
which the jury can use the evidence in their deliberations. For
example, in State v. Hennum82 the court expressly limited the
scope of the expert's testimony to a description of the syndrome
and its characteristics. It also disallowed any conclusory opinion
by the expert on whether the defendant in fact suffered from
battered woman's syndrome.1 8 3 Alternatively, in State u. Wil-
liams18 4 the Missouri Court of Appeals specifically requested the
expert's opinion on whether the defendant suffered from bat-
tered woman's syndrome, finding that without such testimony,
the jury would be left without a guidepost. 8"
Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d
1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fin. Dist. Ct. App.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Strong v. State,
307 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. 1983); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); People v. Gindorf,
512 N.E.2d 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209 (111. App. Ct. 1983);
State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563 (Kart. 1986);
State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985); Commonwealth v. Rose, 725 S.W.2d 588
(Ky. 1987); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 161
(Minn. 1983); State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. CL App. 1990); State v. Norman,
378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171 (N.H. 1980); State v. Myers, 570
A.2d 1260 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1990); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984);
State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. 1986); State v. Branchall, 684 P.2d 1163 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1984); People v. Ciervo, 123 A.D.2d 393, 506 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1986); People v.
Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985); People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 481
N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1984); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983); State v.
Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1986); State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988); State v.
Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984); State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1987); State v.
Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161 (Wis. 1983).
Other courts have refused to admit such expert testimony. Mullis v. State, 282
S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1981); People v. White, 414 N.E.2d 196 (ilL 1980); Fultz v. State, 493
N.E.2d 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1985);
State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Dannels, 734 P.2d 188
(Mont. 1987); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. CL App. 1984); State v. Thomas, 423
N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981), habeas petition denied sub nom. Thomas v. Am, 728 F.2d 813
(6th Cir. 1984), af'd, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); State v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985 (Or. CL App.
1985); Commonwealth v. Dillon, 562 A.2d 885 (Pa. Super. 1989), rev'd, 598 A.2d 963 (Pa.
1991); Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App. Ct. 1985), rev'd, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988); Burhle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
,92 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989).
183 Id. at 799.
184 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. CL App. 1990).
1815 Id. at 313.
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B. Criticisms of the Admissibility and Use of Expert Testi-
mony on Battered Woman's Syndrome
Despite its acceptance by the majority of courts, there are
numerous criticisms of the admissibility and use of expert testi-
mony on battered woman's syndrome in self-defense cases. The
primary objection of its admissibility from critics is that it may
lead to an effective "license to kill" for battered women. 8 8 If
jurors are permitted to hear evidence of the victim's violence
before the moment at issue, they may conclude that even though
the woman's act was not committed in self-defense, she should
be acquitted because the victim deserved to die. 18 7
A second criticism of the testimony's admissibility is that it
may help create a new standard of reasonableness for women's
self-defense cases.'5s By permitting an expert to testify that ob-
jectively unreasonable behavior was reasonable for one individ-
ual, the standard of reasonableness becomes wholly subjectivized
in violation of the general principles of self-defense. 89 Battered
"8 Rittenmyer, Of Battered Wives, Self-Defense and Double Standards of Justice,
9 J. CRIM. JUST. 389, 390 (1981).
The effects of the admission of expert testimony do not appear to support this criti-
cism. Since 1979 when battered woman's syndrome expert testimony first began to be
admitted regularly, the number of homicides committed by battered women have de.
creased approximately 25 percent. Male homicide rates have not been similarly affected.
Browne & Williams, supra note 70, at 80.
16M Mira Mihajlovich, Comment, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman
Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND, L.J. 1253, 1255
(1987) (expert testimony in battered woman's self-defense cases is dangerous because it
"encourages juries to decide difficult cases based on sympathy rather than legal require-
ments"); see also Rosen, supra note 108, at 50 ("Proponents of the battered woman's
defense sympathize so much with the defendant that they have a tendency to focus ex-
clusively on the psychological and physical harm suffered by the woman while forgetting
the abuser. His right to life, though, is equally important as the woman's."); Marilyn
Hall Mitchell, Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1705, 1715,
1725-26 (1978) (acquittals of battered women may appear to sanction retaliation and
revenge).
168 The irony is that this is precisely why feminist legal theorists advocate the use of
expert testimony. Feminist theorists argue that the male-based standard of reasonable-
ness under which the critics view these "unreasonable" acts is unfair because it fails to
take into account the dynamics of intimate violence that may make these acts reasonable
for the battered victim. Expert testimony is needed to explain to the judge and jury how
the woman's acts of survival may have been reasonable for her.
189 Standards for reasonableness vary by jurisdiction. While no state has a purely
subjective standard, many states now employ a subjective/objective standard. See, e.g.,
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (the reasonableness of defendant's
actions are to be viewed from the standpoint of someone of similar mental and physical
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women, therefore, are judged under a more lenient standard
than non-battered defendants who commit the same act under
similar immediate circumstances.19 0
Alternatively, scholars who do not wish to limit or exorcise
expert testimony on intimate violence criticize the manner in
which the testimony is given, heard and used. Much of what
scholars criticize lies in the failure of some courts, attorneys and
expert witnesses to understand the nature of the testimony for
self-defense cases.191 First, the very term "battered woman's de-
fense" to describe expert testimony on battered woman's syn-
drome is misleading because it erroneously suggests that bat-
tered women are offering a completely new, separate or perhaps
experimental defense.19 2 Instead, women are pleading a tradi-
tional case of self-defense, using the expert testimony to help
explain why a victim's prior violence toward them makes a per-
ception of imminent threat reasonable.
A second misperception to which courts regularly fall prey
is that the testimony is being offered to show an impaired
characteristics who knows what the defendant knew about the victim); People v. Torres,
128 Misc. 2d 129, 130, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (1985) (defendant's subjective belief as to
whether the danger was imminent and serious must be reasonable).
190 Rosen, supra note 108, at 43 ("[S]uccessful use of the battered woman's defense
theory depends in part on defense counsel's ability to persuade the court and jury that a
person who did not suffer from battered woman's syndrome would not be justified under
identical objectively identifiable circumstances."). But see Crocker, supra note 101, at
126-27 ("While the legal system maintains that the reasonable man standard is not bi-
ased because the term 'man' or 'men' includes both men and women, legal theorists and
practitioners have shown that this claim is legally and experientially false."). See also
BLAcKmAN, supra note 15, at 189 (Crocker's explanation of the reasonableness of the
battered woman is "an alternative form of reasonableness.... Careful attention to the
battered woman's past experience with her husband's violence enhances one's capacity to
understand her attack against him as reasonable. A true standard of reason is best ap-
proximated when all relevant factors that bear on good judgment are considered.").
191 Schneider, supra note 36, at 198-99; Crocker, supra note 101, at 137.44.
192 See, e.g., State v. Scott, 1989 DeL Super. LEXIS 291, 292 (1989) ("Her claim
which has been referred to as the 'battered woman's defense,' was and is that she was
repeatedly assaulted."); State v. Simons, 731 P.2d 797, 802 (Idaho 1987) ("The 'battered-
woman's defense' has not been directly addressed by our appellate courts."); State v.
Alston, 515 A.2d 1280, 1281 (N.J. 1986) ('IT]he defense has made no decision regarding
the use of applicability of the so-called battered-woman's defense."); Commonwealth v,
Dillon, 562 A.2d 885, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) ("Even if we were to speculate that the
Supreme Court is about to adopt the 'battered-woman' defense in this Commonwealth,
the opinion testimony offered by appellant in this case was properly rejected."), reu'd on
other grounds, 598 A.2d 963 (Pa. 1991).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
mental state. For example, in State v. Hundley 93 the Kansas
Supreme Court interpreted the expert's testimony to mean that
"[b]attered women are terror-stricken people whose mental state
is distorted and bears a marked resemblance to that of a hostage
or a prisoner of war .... They become disturbed persons from
the torture." 194 The purpose of the" testimony, however, is to
show why the defendant's act was reasonable for any person
with the same history of violence in her position. She is not ar-
guing, as many courts believe, that she was incapable of inter-
preting her partner's actions at the time of the threat correctly.
In essence, the court is reverting to a stereotype that women
who kill must be crazy.
Third, courts have also contributed to the confusion by cre-
ating a new standard of reasonableness: the reasonable battered
woman. In State v. Williams'95 the court stated that "the evi-
dence is to be weighed by the jury in light of how the reasonable
battered woman would have perceived and reacted in view of
the prolonged history of abuse."' 96 Again, the court's use of this
different standard for battered women's cases reinforces the mis-
perception that battered women do not react reasonably to
threats of violence. A man in the battered woman's situation,
the court implies, would not react similarly.19 7
193 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985).
194 Id. at 479; see also Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(evidence of battered woman's syndrome should be admitted "to. resolve the issue of...
the appellant's ... ability to knowingly and willingly waive her rights"); State v. Dan-
nels, 734 P.2d 188, 193 (Mo. 1987) ("[I]n every case cited [in support of defendant's
position], the defendant used abused spouse syndrome to prove that she did not have the
requisite state of mind to commit the offense."); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 900
(Mont. 1984) (the expert would have testified that "diminished mental capacity is an
attribute of the battered woman syndrome"); State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 312
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) ("[I]f the evidence of the syndrome it to have any meaning ... it
must be as a modification of the mental state required of the battered woman."); State v.
Alston, 515 A.2d 1280 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (court ordered the defendant,
who may have chosen to use an expert on battered woman's syndrome, to turn over her
psychological and physical medical records as pre-trial discovery because defendants are
required'to give pre-trial notice of defenses based on insanity or mental defect).
1915 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1990).
199 Id. at 312-13; see also Hundley, 693 P.2d at 479 ("The objective test is how a
reasonably prudent battered wife would perceive [the batterer's] demeanor."); State v.
Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 569 (Kan. 1986) (revises the Hundley test to a subjective/objective
test of a reasonably prudent battered woman).
"' Another significant problem with a court's use of a "reasonable battered woman"
standard is that it may be unconstitutional under an equal protection argument. Mather,
supra note 46, at 572 n.220 (citing Michael Buda & Teresa Butler, The Battered Wife
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C. Battered Woman's Syndrome and the Gay or Lesbian
Defendant
The primary problem with battered woman's syndrome ex-
pert testimony for all defendants is that it often enforces the
very stereotypes of women that it seeks to dispel."' Courts,
mimicking the experts' testimony, continue to describe battered
women as helpless, passive and incapacitated victims, stere-
otypical attributes that have plagued women for centuries.100 In
light of judicial use of battered woman's syndrome, the success
of Walker's theory rests more on its emphasis of the stereotypi-
cal helplessness of women than on its illumination of the dy-
namics of intimate violence.2 00
Gay and lesbian defendants, already the victims of stereo-
types that portray them as gender-confused,20' will be forced to
Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J FAM L. 359, 379 (1984)); see
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (a state may not use classifications based on
gender if a gender-neutral standard will serve the state's purpose).
9"8 See Schneider, supra note 36, at 198, 208-20.
19 See, e.g., Hundley, 693 P.2d at 479 (referring to battered women as "terror-
stricken people whose mental state is distorted"); State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1266
(Me. 1983) (Battered women "typically stay with their men out of economic dependence
and... frequently... react with passivity to the violence of their mates."); State v.
Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that the woman's failure to
leave the relationship is a result of learned helplessness and characterizes the defendant
as hysterical and crying after the final beating); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (Wash.
1984) (describing learned helplessness as a condition that results when a woman is "psy-
chologically locked into her situation due to economic dependence on the man, and an
abiding attachment to him").
200 Furthermore, this description of battered women as helpless has been challenged
by more recent studies on victims' reactions to intimate violence:
The suggestion that battered women are "helpless" is really a misnomer. Bat-
tered women are often resourceful and active in their efforts to avoid violence
within the context of the relationship. They simply tend not to act in ways
that would enable them to leave the relationship. Furthermore, especially for
battered women who kill, the suggestion in Walker's language that they must
be "helpless" if they have been battered can function to predispose the jury
against them. The jurors may believe that a helpless woman could never pull a
trigger, that a helpless woman could only endure the abuse, but could not re-
spond in kind.
BLAc AN, supra note 15, at 192. In addition, a dilemma is created for the defense to
explain a passive, helpless person's active use of force against his or her partner. Schnei-
der, supra note 36, at 220-22. Experts who rely exclusively on Walker's model and em-
phasize the defendant's passiveness and helplessness confuse the jury. The defendant's
actions, for which she is on trial, appear to be inconsistent with her prior inability to
leave, defend herself or seek help.
200 See supra note 91 (reviewing prevalent stereotypes of gay men and lesbians).
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defend not only their action, but their ability to fit within the
stereotyped female gender-role. Experts who explain intimate
violence in the terms used for battered woman's syndrome will
encourage the jury to try to fit the same-sex relationship into
the mold of a heterosexual relationship. 202 This can lead to in-
creased stereotyping and confusion, as the expert and the jury
will be forced to ask themselves who played the role of the man
and who played the role of the woman.2 °s The chance that either
202 Gay men and lesbians criticize the use of most feminist theories on intimate vio-
lence as it applies to them a" an attempt to force same-sex couples into a heterosexist
model of human relationships:
Domestic violence in feminist legal theory is not necessarily applicable to les-
bian legal theory because feminist legal theory is often based upon heterosexist
assumptions.... [I]f lesbian legal theory were to adopt such a view [that do-
mestic violence is caused by gender differences], it would hetero-relationize it-
self in the same manner in which the legal system often hetero-relationizes
lesbian relationships. To sanction [Catherine] MacKinnon's view [that all vio-
lence against women is sex-based] would be to make relevant an inquiry into
"who is the man" in order to determine the identity of the batterer.
Robson, supra note 63, at 584-86. If one views intimate violence as not just a result of
gender differences, however, but also a result of differences in power created by dispari-
ties in race, economic power, education or physical or psychological strength, then vio-
lence between gay men and lesbians does not have to be seen in terms of gender. See
Hart, supra note 42, at 174-75.
203 The effect of the use of terms and ideas associated with battered woman's syn-
drome, stereotyped gender-roles and stereotypes of lesbian behavior was evident in the
court documents submitted by Green's attorneys. See Brief for Appellant at 5, State v.
Green, (No. 90-0039) (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1990) ("Julio [the batterer/victim] was dominant
in the relationship."); id. at 10 ("Julio was strong for a woman."); Appellant's Response
to Motion in Limine at 3, Grben (Fla. 15 Cir. 1989) (No. 88-14183 CF A02) ("Defendant
will testify that she assumed the 'female' role and cared for the children. She was
charged with keeping the peace in the household and caring for the minor children.").
Defendant's Motion for Jury Selection Expert at County Expense at 2, Green (Fla. 15
Cir. 1989) (No. 88-14183 CF A02):
[Clounsel should not be expected to assess, without professional assistance, the
potential impact on a fair trial of the opinions of individual jurors on such
issues as sexism, the battered woman syndrome, homosexual and lesbian rela-
tionships, and the assumption by those in such relationships of traditional
male-dominant and female-submissive roles. In short, competent defense coun-
sel in a case where an abused party within a lesbian relationship who has as-
sumed the subservient, female, mother role must have their assistance of a pro-
fessional knowledgeable in these concepts in order to provide the effective
assistance of counsel during voir dire.
See also Perez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (although defend-
ant, who was accused of murdering her lesbian ex-lover, testified that she was not a
lesbian, the court noted that the defendant "always dressed like a man; kept her hair cut
like a man; wore men's clothing ... and . . . 'always takes a man's place.' ") (quoting a
witness).
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the defendant or the batterer/victim will fit into stereotypical
gender roles is minimal.'
Furthermore, the harsh reality is that the popular image of
the battered woman as small, meek and cowering will not trans-
late to a defendant as large and strong as his or her partner.
Although the gay or lesbian defendant may not be equal in size
and strength to the abusive partner, generally the discrepancy
between the two will not be as extreme as the discrepancy be-
tween men and women. This discrepancy between men and
women has been, at least in part, the basis courts have used to
liberalize the proportional force rule and to subjectivize the
standard for the defendant's belief of imminent danger2
Judges and jurors will have great difficulty understanding the
dynamics of intimate violence when unable to view the defend-
ant as the weaker, helpless victim described in Walker's
model.20
The description of the battered person as a helpless, passive
victim also does not translate to defendants who on prior occa-
sions fought back or attempted to flee. Despite the recognition
from experts on heterosexual intimate violence that battered
women engage in defensive actions (mutual battering),07 this as-
pect of intimate violence is antithetical to Walker's model of the
passive victim. While it is not clear whether battered gay or les-
bian victims engage in more mutual battering than heterosexual
214 Same-sex relationships may be less likely than heterosexual relationships to
involve gender-type roles. Available data indicate that most lesbians and gay
men do not play rigid 'husband/wife' roles in such areas as decision-making,
sexual behavior, and the division of household tasks; although task specializa-
tion often occurs, it typically is based on individual skills and preferences, with
neither partner assuming exclusively 'masculine' or 'feminine' tasks.
Herek, supra note 49, at 163.
205 See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) ("In our
society women suffer from a conspicuous lack of access to training in and the means of
developing those skills necessary to effectively repel a male assailant without resorting to
the use of deadly weapons.").
Commentators have also emphasized the physical differences between men and
women to explain women's inability to ward off attacks successfully and for their ulti-
mate use of a weapon against an unarmed man. See Crocker, supra note 101, at 127;
Mather, supra note 46, at 565; Rosen, supra note 108, at 34, Schneider, supra note 93, at
632.
20e See People v. Huber, 475 N.E.2d 599, 601 (I1. App. CL 1985) (court found that
the defendant's size was relevant when she was "physically larger than the decedent" in
a lesbian self-defense case where there was a history of intimate violence).
207 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text discussing mutual battering.
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women, 20 1 the fact that the partners are of the same gender and
are likely to be of relatively the same size may suggest to the
fact-finder that the defendant did fight back or at least had the
capacity to fight back.
If the defendant did engage in mutual battering or any
other non-passive behavior, as Annette Green did, the prosecu-
tion will be able to argue that the defendant is not a "battered
woman" because he or she does not fit the model. In State v.
Anaya20 9 the expert recited the Walker model when she testified
that "battered wives typically stay with their men out of eco-
nomic dependency, and that they 'most frequently.., react with
passivity' to the violence of their mates." 10 In this case, how-
ever, the defendant's boyfriend was unemployed throughout the
time the couple lived together and the defendant had stabbed
the victim on an earlier occasion.21' The prosecution was permit-
ted to use the expert's characterization of battered woman's syn-
drome to refute the "battered wife defense. 2 12
Finally, both experts and courts have contributed to the
creation of a new stereotype, the "good battered woman," that
gay and lesbian defendants will have difficulty overcoming. Part
of the problem arises from the characterization of the effects of
intimate violence as a "syndrome. 21 3 The word appears to con-
note an illness for which there are definitive symptoms subject
to accurate diagnosis. "Expert testimony on the 'battered wo-
man syndrome' . . . although intended to address damaging
myths and misconcreetions, also contributes in a subtle way to
an image of maladjustment or pathology. Just the use of the
term 'syndrome' connotes impairment to most people, including
208 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text discussing mutual battering.
209 456 A.2d 1255, 1266 (Me. 1983); see also Mullis v. State, 282 S.E.2d 334 (Ga.
1981) (court refused to admit expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome because
the evidence showed that the defendant routinely fought back).
110 Anaya, 456 A.2d at 1266 (quoting the trial transcript).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 566 (Kan. 1986) (discussing "[slymptoms
manifested by a woman suffering from the syndrome"); State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475,
478 (Kan. 1985) (referring to battered woman's syndrome as a malady); Fielder v. State,
683 S.W.2d 565, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (finding that battered women "suffer" from
common characteristics), rev'd on other grounds, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988).
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judges and jurors."21 4 A battered gay man or lesbian who does
not exhibit all or some of the "symptoms" (e.g., passivity, eco-
nomic or emotional dependence, lack of education or total isola-
tion from family or friends) 2111 will be categorized as a "bad bat-
tered woman" or not a battered woman at all.2 , s Thus, the focus
of the cases tends to be on whether the defendant is entitled to
call himself or herself a "battered woman," not whether the de-
fendant's action was reasonable or justified.17
214 BROWNE, supra note 15, at 177.
2" See, e.g., Hundley, 693 P.2d at 479 ("Quite likely emotional and financial depen-
dency are the primary reasons for remaining in the household."); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364, 372 (N.J. 1984) ("[T]he stigma that attaches to a woman who leaves the family unit
without her children undoubtably acts as a further deterrent to moving out."); People v.
Torres, 128 Misc. 2d. 129, 132, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (Battered women's
"emotional paralysis is often reinforced by their traditional beliefs about the sanctity of
home and family and their false hopes that things will improve. . . ."); Fielder, 683
S.W.2d at 587 ("A battered woman displays and suffers from certain common character-
istics.... For whatever the reasons, these women find themselves in an abusive relation-
ship from which they do not act to escape."); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (Wash.
CL App. 1984) (en banc.) (A battered women is "locked into her situation due to eco-
nomic dependency on the man, and an abiding attachment to him .... "); State v. Ciskie,
751 P.2d 1165, 1172 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (A battered woman is "'very frustrated and
accepts the kind of behavior that is going on, and rather than striking out tends to inter-
nalize it....' ") (quoting the expert's trial testimony).
216 Crocker, supra note 101, at 144-50. Some courts have refused to allow a woman
who did not fit the stereotype of the good battered woman to use expert testimony. See
Mullis v. State, 282 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1981) (court excluded expert testimony where the
evidence showed that the defendant routinely fought back); State v. Williams, 787
S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo. CL App. 1990) (trial court excluded expert testimony because the
defendant was not married to the batterer).
Prosecutors also rely on these stereotypes in an attempt to refute the defendant's
assertion that she is a battered woman. See State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1266 (Me.
1988) (state characterized the fact that the defendant worked as tending to refute her
status as a battered woman); People v. Powell, 102 Misc. 2d 626, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1980)
(State's witness testified to defendant's knowledge and use of guns, implying that the
defendant was not a helpless victim; the prosecution also argued that the defendant was
a sexual masochist and voluntarily participated in the violence.); State v. Ciervo, 123
A.D.2d 393, 396, 506 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (2d Dep't 1986) (state characterized the defend-
ant as a drug user, a neglectful mother, an adulteress, and an inadequate housekeeper to
refute her claim that she suffered from battered woman's syndrome and to show how she
provoked the violence).
21I The fundamental problem with the battered woman stereotype is that it
allows the legal system to continue considering the defendant's claim based on
who she is, not on what she did.... [It] creates a very narrow range of options
for a woman when she is judged by the legal system: either she is held to a
battered woman's standard requiring strict adherence to judicially-imposed cri-
teria, or she is relegated to meeting an inappropriate and inapplicable reasona-
ble man standard.
Crocker, supra note 101, at 149-50.
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Gay and lesbian defendants who try to use the battered wo-
man's syndrome testimony are in for a double whammy. First,
the theory is already flawed as it applies to heterosexual women.
Second, the theory's procrustean bed may break under the ten-
sion of applying it to gay and lesbian relationships. In essence,
the theory relies on gender stereotypes for its impact. Stereo-
types, such as women's socialized passivity, their economic de-
pendence and their lesser size, strength and fighting ability, are
central to the explanation of why women are abused by men and
why they have difficulty leaving or fighting back. Once battered
woman's syndrome expert testimony is drained of these
gendered notions, it offers little to no explanation of why inti-
mate violence occurs in same-sex relationships or why battered
gay men and lesbians have difficulty in separating themselves
from the relationship.
D. Toward a More Gender-Neutral Theory of Intimate Vio-
lence for Gay and Lesbian Defendants
To avoid these problems, an expert witness in a battered
gay man's or lesbian's self-defense case must present a theory of
intimate violence that does not depend upon the gender of the
batterer and victim. Since most of the current research on inti-
mate violence is based on heterosexual women's experiences,
however, there are no "genderless" theories of adult intimate vi-
olence available. Thus any expert on intimate violence must de-
pend on theories that have been developed for heterosexual
women. This problem is not insurmountable. At least two cur-
rent theorists, Dr. Angela Browne and Dr. Julie Blackman, have
authored studies on intimate violence that avoid many of the
pitfalls associated with Walker's model.21 In particular, neither
28 See BROWNE, supra note 15; BLACKMAN, supra note 15. In addition to WHEN BAT-
TERED WOMEN KILL, Browne has also authored or co-authored a number of articles in-
cluding: Angela Browne, Assault and Homicide at Home: When Battered Women Kill, 3
ADVANCES IN APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (M. J. Sakes & L. Saxe eds., 1986); Angela
Browne, Comparison of Victim's Reactions Across Traumas, Paper Presented at the
Rocky Mountain Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Tucson, Arizona (1980); Ex-
ploring the Effect of Resource Availability, supra note 70; Angela Browne & Kirk R.
Williams, Trends in Partner Homicide: A Comparison of Homicides Between Marital
and Non-Marital Partners from 1976-1987 (available from University of Massachusetts
Medical School Library).
In addition to INTIMATE VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INJUSTICE, Julie Blackman has au-
thored or co-authored the following: Julie Blackman, Emerging Images of Severely Bat-
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theorist's work depends on portraying the battered person as
helpless or passive. Both characterize the battered woman's be-
havior in avoiding the violence and coping in other areas of her
life as active. 19 Since battered women have encountered such
difficulty when experts used Walker's theory of learned helpless-
ness to explain why the women failed to leave, this difference is
significant.
Browne's study is particularly compelling because its focus
is specifically on battered women who killed, rather than on bat-
tered women generally. When the two groups were compared,
Browne found that there were no significant differences between
the backgrounds of the women (i.e., education, employment sta-
tus, violence in childhood),220 but theie were very significant dif-
ferences in the behavior of the batterer and in the frequency and
severity of their violence against their spouses. 221 By explaining
tered Women and the Criminal Justice System, 8 BEHiv. SCL & L 121 (1990); Julie
Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of
Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WoMEN's RTs. L Rm. 227 (1986); Julie Blackman & E.
Brickman, The Impact of Expert Testimony on Trials of Battered Women Who Kill
Their Husbands, 2 BEHAV. SCL & L. 413 (1984); Julie Blackman, Battered Women Who
KilL" New Perspectives on the Concept of Self Defense, Paper Presented at American
Psychological Association Meeting, Toronto, Canada (Aug. 1984); Julie Blackman, Bat-
tered Women Who Kill and the Passover Question: Why Is This Night Different from
All Other Nights? Or Is It?, Paper Presented at Association for Women in Psycholov,
Denver, Colorado (Mar. 1987); Julie Blackman, Conceptions of Justice and the Use of
Expert Testimony on Battered Woman's Syndrome, Paper Presented at Fourth Annual
Adelphi University Applied Experimental Psychology Conference (1985); Julie
Blackman, Expert Testimony for Battered Women Who Kill: Dilemmas of Objectivity
and Bias, Paper Presented at American Psychological Association Meeting, New York,
N.Y. (August 1987); Julie Blackman, A Narrowed Vision: Clarity and Clouds in Victims
of Family Violence, Paper Presented at University of New Hampshire Family Violence
Researchers' Conference, Durham, N.H. (July 1987).
219 BROWNE, supra note 15, at 125-27; BLAcnaAN, supra note 15, at 192-93.
20 BROWNE, supra note 15, at 20-27, 181. Browne notes that the vomen in the homi-
cide group did tend to be somewhat older at the time of the interview and came from a
higher social background than battered women who did not kill. Id. at 21. Approximately
71 percent of the women in the homicide group, as opposed to approximately 65 percent
of the women in the comparison group, experienced violence at home as children. Id. at
23.
221 Id. at 55-74 & 89-97.
Men in the homicide group used drugs more frequently than did men in the
comparison group, and became intoxicated much more often. They were also
more frequently given to threats and assaultative behavior Significantly more
men in the homicide group threatened to kill someone other than themselves;
more of them abused a child or children, as well as their women partners; and
their abuse of their mates was more frequent, more injurious, and more likely
to include sexual assault.
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these differences to a jury, the expert can lay the groundwork for
the jury's interpretation of the defendant's act as reasonable:
[A] knowledge of the history of the prior violence and the specific con-
text within which the incident occurred is essential for understanding
the woman's perceptions at the time of the homicide .... [T]he life of
a battered woman is "replete with prior provocation, continuing ap-
prehension, and the constant threat of impending danger."... As we
learn more about battered women ... those who kill.., seem to be
reacting to the level of violence perpetrated against them.2 22
To explain why some battered women fail to leave the rela-
tionship, Browne looks at the battered woman's dim view of her
alternatives. Here, she compares battered women with other vic-
tims of trauma. Like victims of disasters and wars, battered
women focus on self-protection and survival during the impact.
phase.223
[B]attered women's affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses are
likely to become distorted by their intense focus on survival. They
may have developed a whole range of responses such as controlling
their breathing or not crying out in pain, in an effort to mitigate the
severity of the abuse during violent episodes, but have not developed
any plans for escaping the abusive situations.2 2'
They later "may be extremely suggestible or dependent and,
during the period that follows, may minimize the damage or per-
sonal loss. This is often followed by a 'euphoric' stage, marked
by unrealistic expectations about recovery. ' ' 25 Browne finds
even a closer parallel between battered women and prisoners of
war:
"Fight or flight" responses are inhibited by a perception of the aggres-
sor's power to inflict damage or death, and depression often results,
based on the perceived hopelessness of the situation. The victims' per-
ceptions of their alternatives become increasingly limited the longer
they remain in the situation, and those alternatives that do exist often
seem to pose too great a threat to survival.2 26
Belief that safe alternatives exist is still more unlikely for gay
Id. at 181-82.
222 Id. at 175-76 (quoting Nancy Fiora-Gormally, Battered Wives Who Kill: Double
Standard Out of Court, Single Standard In?, 2 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 133, 141 (1978)).
22 Id. at 123.
22 Id. at 125-26.
222 Id. at 123.
22 Id. at 124.
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men and lesbians who in fact have even fewer alternatives than
heterosexual battered women.227
The victim's behavior and perceptions must be viewed in
light of both factors: the level of violence perpetrated against
them and their diminished ability to perceive escape opportuni-
ties. While the victim may initially remain with the batterer out
of love or a sense of commitment or responsibility to the bat-
terer or children, the victim's reasons for remaining change over
the course of the relationship. Browne noted that
as the severity and frequency of abuse increases, three additional fac-
tors have a major impact on the women's decision to stay with violent
partners: (1) practical problems in effecting a separation [like the lack
of access to shelters], (2) the fear of retaliation if they do leave, and
(3) the shock reactions of victims to abuse. 2 '
Browne's model creates a more stark and frightening portrait of
the abusive relationship than the Walker model and, with the
focus on the brutality of the abuser, permits a jury to interpret
the defendant's reaction as reasonable more easily.
The most significant difference between Blackman's and
Browne's study is Blackman's theory of why the battered woman
remains in the relationship.221 9 One of Blackman's fundamental
premises is that "intimate violence does harm to victims' con-
cepts of justice. 2 30 Without a sense of what is just, a person is
less able to perceive injustice and act on this perception. Dam-
age to a person's justice concept "narrows the vision of the vic-
tim, diminishing the ability to perceive alternatives and leading
to an unusual level of acceptance of cognitive inconsistency as a
way of coping."2 31 Blackmun argued:
[T]his tolerance of inconsistency is a reflection of the fundamental in-
consistency of their lives: that the man who supposedly loves them
227 See supra notes 66-80 aid accompanying text (discussing the lack of emergency
services available for gay men and lesbians).
22 BRowNE, supra note 15, at 110.
29 Blackman's and Browne's theories are not incongruous and one may be uzed in
conjunction with the other. Since Browne's research was done specifically on battered
women who kill, however, the analysis is particularly useful for self-defense cases. As
Browne notes, there are significant differences between the relationships of battered
women who kill and battered women who do not. While Blackman's theory on why bat-
tered women do not leave also is useful, her discussion of the expert's role in the court-
room is especially important. See BLACKiAN, supra note 15, at 186-211.
22 Id. at 116.
22 Id. at 117.
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also hurts them. This characteristic of battered women is particularly
important for jurors to understand, since it may cause her to describe
the events of her life in ways that are seemingly contradictory and
may be misinterpreted as signs of a generally poor memory or of bun-
gled attempts to be deceptive.
232
Thus, Blackman's research goes a little further than Browne's to
explain the differences in perception that may result from long-
term battering. Such an explanation may aid the jury in under-
standing more fully why many battered victims are able to sur-
vive within the context of a relationship without becoming men-
tally impaired.
Both Browne's and Blackman's works are especially impor-
tant to gay and lesbian defendants because both include re-
search that can be applied in a gender-neutral manner. Browne's
comparison between victims of trauma and battered women is
particularly useful because of the connection between non-gen-
der-specific victims and battered victims. In addition, because
Browne's study reveals significant differences in the violence of
the relationship of battered women who kill, the jury's attention
is shifted away from the psychology and gender of the defend-
ant, and toward the batterer and his or her acts of violence.
Although Blackman's work is primarily the result of re-
search on women, her theories are not necessarily gender-spe-
cific. While more research needs to be done on same-sex inti-
mate violence, it is likely that any victim of ongoing intimate
violence will experience the cognitive reactions that Blackman
found in battered-women. Finally, it is important to note that
neither researcher uses the term "battered woman's syndrome."
The absence in their theoretical language of such gender-based
terminology makes the adaptation of the theories to gay men
and lesbians easier.
Yet, the simple presentation of a gender-neutral theory of
intimate violence will not create by itself an environment free
from damaging stereotypes, it merely will not add to those which
already exist. Jurors who believe that homosexuals routinely
sexually molest children 33 or attempt to convert children to ho-
232 Id. at 194.
233 See Herek, supra note 49, at 152-56 (noting that a 1989 Gallup poll found that
58 percent of Americans would not allow gay men or lesbians to teach elementary
school).
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mosexuality23 4 may be predisposed to convicting a gay or lesbian
defendant regardless of the case's merits.35 Jurors who believe
that same-sex couples are incapable of sustaining long-term rela-
tionships may be unable to understand the impact of intimate
violence on a gay or lesbian individual.236 They may assume that
it is easier for a gay man or lesbian to leave the relationship
merely because the relationship is not as important to them as
relationships are to heterosexuals.237 Therefore, experts must
also be prepared to educate the jury on the nature of same-sex
relationships and to refute the stereotypes and prejudices that
both the judge and jury bring with them into the courtroom. 238
2 See id. at 157-61 (citing studies that show children of gay or lesbian parents are
no more likely to be homosexual than children of heterosexual parents).
13 In Green the defense argued on appeal that at least two of the jurors were biased
against the defendant because of her sexual orientation. One juror overheard a conversa-
tion between two other seated jurors in which one said, "That F'ing [sic] lesbian, they
ought to hang that F'ing lesbian." Appellant's Brief at 34, State v. Green, No. 90-0039
(Fla. 4 Dist 1990). Green was ultimately reversed, but not on this point. Green v. State,
575 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1991).
23' The fact that a significant number of jurors or potential jurors may believe cer-
tain myths about gay men or lesbians, or may be deeply prejudiced against them, should
indicate to attorneys the need to use an expert during voir dire. In Green the defense
attorney noted in his motion for a jury selection expert that
the issue of homosexuality is also subject to a high degree of prejudice. The
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force estimates that 80 percent of their popu-
lation is homophobes [sic] and that lesbian [sic] and gays are the most fre-
quent victims of hate crime in the United States. In this case, the jury will be
subjected to detailed [accounts] of the Defendant's emotional and physical re-
lationship with the alleged victim which involves [sic] acts that some may
think are unnatural or immoral. Determination of the ability of the juror to be
fair to one [who] is involved in a homosexual relationship is essential.
Appellant's Brief at 42, Green, No. 90-0039 (Fla. 14 Dist. Nov. 26, 1990). In Green the
motion for an expert at voir dire was denied. The failure of the attorney to discover the
jurors' biases may have been fatal to Green's case. See also Blackman, Potential Uses for
Expert Testimony, supra note 217 (advocating the use of experts for grand juries, for
arguing motions and in the sentencing process).
1-1 See Herek, supra note 49, at 161-64 (citing studies tending to show that not only
do gay men and lesbians have long-term intimate relationships, but that these relation-
ships are equally as satisfying and are often as sexually exclusive as heterosexual
relationships).
22" One method the defense can use to expose and refute damaging stereotypes is to
prepare carefully the expert beforehand for the questions on direct examination. For
example, when asked why the battered defendant did not leave the household, the expert
should list the difficulty gay men and lesbians have in finding adequate shelter space; the
potential consequences of going to the police or having his or her sexual orientation
made public; the history of difficulty gay men and lesbians have had with the police and
the criminal justice system; the potential criminal liabilities associated with sodomy
laws; and the difficulty in obtaining a temporary restraining order in some states.
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In sum, an expert on same-sex intimate violence must be for
the battered gay or lesbian defendant what experts on battered
woman's syndrome are for battered women: a translator of their
lives' experiences. Experts can "educate the judge and jury
about the common experiences of battered [persons and] . . .
explain the context in wliich an individual battered [person] ac-
ted, so as to lend credibility and provide a context to [his or her]
explanation of [the] action. '239 Expert testimony can also refute
judges' and jurors' own stereotypes of both intimate violence
and the gay and lesbian lifestyle as well as "answer specific
questions that are in judges' and jurors' minds of why the bat-
tered [defendant] didn't leave home ... and most importantly,
why [he or] she believed that the danger.., faced on the partic-
ular occasion was life-threatening."240 Gay or lesbian defendants
on trial for killing their intimate partners who are not availed of
this opportunity lack a fundamental right to be judged fairly
without regard to their sexual orientation.
CONCLUSION
Victims of intimate violence endure in their relationships a
type of violence and control that is incomprehensible to many
people. Those people, who often are the judges and jurors in
cases where the victim kills the batterer, have few references in
their own lives by which to measure the battered defendant's
thoughts or perceptions at the moment when he or she used le-
thal force in self-defense.
Feminist legal theorists, who were concerned with the fair-
ness of battered women's self-defense cases, moved the judicial
system to implement major changes in the way that battered
women's cases were being heard and adjudicated. Many of the
theories that evolved from the early work on battered women
can inform the way that battered gay and lesbian self-defense
cases are presented. At the same time, the gender-based as-
sumptions that form a foundation for much of the theories can-
not be translated readily to same-sex relationships.
Thus legal theorists, researchers and advocates must work
together to create a form of expert testimony that does not de-
239 Schneider, supra note 36, at 201.
"0 Id. at 202.
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pend upon the gender of the batterer or the victim. This does
not negate what work has gone on before with battered women;
it merely expands the horizons of the work to include persons
who experience the same violence in their relationships, but who
are not traditionally studied. Intimate violence, especially of the
kind that is so severe and frequent as to end in the death of one
partner, does not appear to discriminate between heterosexual
and same-sex partners. Our theories and their application, espe-
cially in court, should reflect this reality.
Denise Bricker

